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Scholars of the American Civil War have questioned Kentucky’s loyalty to the Union. A 
consequence of its delayed entry into the war as well as Kentuckians’ deep commitment to 
slavery, many have viewed Kentucky’s loyalty as wholly conditional on the preservation of 
slavery. Though containing merit, such conclusions have understandably led to the premise that 
after emancipation became a federal war aim, Kentucky’s loyalty to the Union waned. However, 
examining Kentucky’s recruitment records throughout the war and comparing them to the only 
other similarly populated northern states of Michigan and Wisconsin not only challenges these 
assumptions, but asserts that the opposite is indeed true. Compared to these free states, Kentucky 
proportionally recruited more Union troops in a shorter amount of time. Resultantly, Kentucky 
exhausted its white manpower reserves at a faster rate. By 1864, a year after the Emancipation 
Proclamation and the legalization of black recruitment, the state could no longer meet its quota 
with white men as there simply were not enough left. The fact Kentucky achieved a proportional 
service record by the end of 1863, which compared to Michigan and Wisconsin’s, emphasizes 
that Kentucky’s loyalty to the Union did not necessarily wane because of emancipation and black 
recruitment. On the contrary, the state exhausted its white manpower two years before the war’s 
end to prevent the necessity of these initiatives and preserve the stability of its institutions. 
The question remains as to why Kentucky exhibited such an effort when other states did 
not. Unlike Michigan or Wisconsin, Kentucky’s status as a slave state ultimately shaped its entire 




nonetheless affected the state’s broader economic and cultural character.1 Appreciating the 
investment value of chattel property as well as the racial hegemony it afforded whites, slavery 
became a part of the state’s identity and directly or indirectly affected all Kentuckians.2 
Therefore, when threats, such as a Confederate invasion in 1861, or federal emancipation and 
black recruitment in 1863, challenged the stability of the institution, white Kentuckians opted to 
enlist for its defense. That is partially why the state witnessed two of its major recruitment drives 
during these respective years. Slavery was the primary differentiator that motivated white 
Kentuckians to outpace the recruitment efforts of their non-slave holding counterparts in 
Michigan and Wisconsin. 
Kentucky’s effort to preserve slavery by supporting the Union represents a tempered 
calculation that embodies the state’s broader character. During the five months of neutrality, 
Kentuckians constantly debated and delayed making a decision about which side to join. Weary 
of Southern fire-eaters as well as radical Northern abolitionists, white Kentuckians sought 
moderation and law. A result of their experiences in the antebellum period, this stance helped 
characterize the ideologically diverse state, which contained both pro-slavery and free-labor 
proponents, and shaped their decision as they entered the war. Ultimately, though, many 
Kentuckians viewed the Confederacy as unstable, evident by General Leonidas Polk’s 
unsanctioned invasion, and unsympathetic to their desire to keep the disruptive war out of their 
state. These concerns cast legitimacy on the Union’s promise not to interfere with slavery as the 
federal government had generally respected the state’s sovereignty in the past. This led many 
                                                          
1 Luke Harlow, Religion, Race, and the Making of Confederate Kentucky, 1830-1880 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 161. 
2 For information on slavery’s impact on Kentucky’s economy and role of race, see Michael Robinson, A Union 
Indivisible: Secession and the Politics of Slavery in the Border South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2017), 15-25, and Harold Tallant, Evil Necessity: Slavery and Political Culture in Antebellum Kentucky 




white Kentuckians to conclude they could depend upon the word and law of the federal 
government that restoring the Union, not abolition, was their objective. Consequently, 
Kentuckians utilized the Union as a catalyst to preserve and perpetuate slavery throughout the 
tumultuous war. 
Kentucky’s transitioning political identity during the war mirrored the state’s desire to 
maintain stability and preserve slavery. During the first few months of the conflict, Kentucky 
governor Beriah Magoffin, a southern-sympathizer, attempted to maintain a stance of neutrality. 
Hoping to counter the unionist legislature’s desire to ally to the federal government and to 
protect the state from civil war, Magoffin refused to commit to either faction.3 However, when 
the state responded to a Confederate invasion by allying to the Union, the state’s political 
character shifted and Magoffin eventually resigned from office as a result.4 
After Magoffin’s official term ended, Kentuckians elected Thomas Bramlette as their 
new governor. A unionist Democrat, Bramlette intended to represent the interests of his 
constituents by preserving slavery and the state’s unionist ties. Unlike Magoffin, Bramlette 
worked well with the unionist legislature and endeavored to keep the state loyal. Furthermore, 
Bramlette’s conservative unionism corresponded well with the state’s broader political beliefs as 
proven when Kentucky overwhelmingly voted for unionist Democrat George B. McClellan 
during the 1864 presidential election.5 Although Bramlette often disagreed with Lincoln and the 
Republican Party, especially regarding emancipation and black recruitment, he nonetheless 
                                                          
3 Magoffin maintained neutrality by refusing to recruit troops for Lincoln in the wake of Fort Sumter and by 
denouncing secession so long as Lincoln did not touch slavery. For more information see William C. Harris, Lincoln 
and the Border States: Preserving the Union (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 81-81. 
4 Kentuckians voted to have a Unionist majority legislature in June 1861 during neutrality. James Robinson stepped 
in as a temporary governor to complete Magoffin’s remaining term which ended in September 1863. Magoffin never 
joined the Confederacy, even after he resigned.  




remained a staunch supporter of the federal government throughout the war. Although 
Kentucky’s political leadership shifted during the conflict, from a southern-sympathizer to a 
staunch unionist, the state’s desire to maintain stability and preserve slavery proved a 
transcendent characteristic of the state. 
The alliance between Kentucky and the Union would prove stronger than many 
contemporary historians have conceded. Focusing on 1863, with the introduction of 
emancipation and black recruitment, many scholars have argued that Kentucky’s overall 
commitment to the Union diminished. Examining the yearly recruitment data of the state though, 
reveals that this was not the case.6 When the federal government officially sanctioned black 
recruitment in March of 1863, Kentuckians committed their last reserves of manpower to the 
Union. Representing a potential threat to the institution of slavery in Kentucky, thousands of 
white men entered federal service to nullify the need for black soldiers. Unlike Michigan or 
Wisconsin, which turned to the draft and their small black populations to help fill their quotas, 
Kentucky managed to furnish enough white volunteers to prevent either measure. However, after 
three years in which armies of both sides claimed thousands of Kentucky volunteers, this effort 
represented the final reserves which the state could commit. While Michigan and Wisconsin 
maintained healthy reserves of white manpower later into the war, Kentucky had simply run out 
and had to allow federal authorities to recruit African Americans. This work argues that 
Kentucky’s diminished recruiting during the final two years of the war was not a result of 
waning unionist loyalty. Rather, the state’s declining white recruitment embodied total military 
exhaustion brought about by the effort to preserve and perpetuate slavery. 
                                                          
6 I examined Kentucky’s Adjutant General Report and the 1860 Census to determine how the state’s recruitment 




The argument that Kentucky exhausted its white manpower reserves to preserve slavery 
diverges from other scholarly work on the field. The recent work of authors such as Michael 
Crane Jr., Aaron Astor, Patrick Lewis, Bridget Ford, Luke Harlow, William C. Harris, and Shae 
Smith Cox, addressed multiple factors that contributed to the state’s loyalty.7 Examining such 
components as politics, religion, and economics, all seemed to stress the underlying influence of 
slavery on the state unionist loyalty. However, none directly referenced Kentucky’s yearly 
recruitment trends. Consequently, the traditional consensus claims that Kentucky’s loyalty 
gradually declined as emancipation and black recruitment became apparent Union objectives. In 
contrast, this work argues that Kentucky’s unionism did not wane as a consequence of 
emancipation and black recruitment. Instead, these measures strengthened Kentucky’s resolve to 
exhaust its white manpower, negate the need of black recruitment, and preserve and stabilize 
slavery in the state. 
The notion that emancipation and black recruitment discouraged Kentucky unionism is 
an argument posed by many prominent scholars in this field. Crane’s microhistory, “The Demise 
of Slavery on the Border: Federal Policy and the Union Army in Henderson, Kentucky,” 
examines how unionist sentiment in this community waned as a result of black recruitment. 
Crane contends that in 1863, Henderson’s efforts to organize “slave patrols” to halt the Union 
army’s “harvest of the area’s male slaves,” displayed the state’s discontent at serving a federal 
                                                          
7 Michael J. Crane Jr, "The Demise of Slavery on the Border: Federal Policy and the Union Army in Henderson, 
Kentucky," Register of Kentucky State Historical Society, 113, (Autumn 2015), 601-640; Aaron Astor, Rebels on the 
Border: Civil War, Emancipation, and the Reconstruction of Kentucky and Missouri (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2012); Patrick Lewis, For Union and Slavery: Benjamin Buckner and Kentucky Loyalties in the 
Civil War (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015); Bridget Ford, Bonds of Union: Religion, Race, and 
Politics in a Civil War Borderland (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016); Harlow, Religion, Race, 
and the Making of Confederate Kentucky; Harris, Lincoln and the Border States; Shae Smith Cox, “Kentucky's 
Conflict as a Border State during the Secession Crisis” (Master’s Thesis, Oklahoma State University, 2013), 12, 




government that no longer supported slavery.8 This claim effectively underlines a devotion to 
slavery by implying that the community’s efforts to preserve it simply encouraged them to 
redirect their federal recruiting efforts to favor local militias. 
Similarly, Astor’s Rebels on the Border: Civil War, Emancipation, and the 
Reconstruction of Kentucky and Missouri argues Kentucky’s devotion to slavery encouraged 
many to forsake the Union after the fall of 1862. Instead of continuing to devote troops to the 
Union, Astor emphasizes Kentucky’s rampant guerrilla fighting as an example of how the 
Emancipation Proclamation and black recruitment undermined white unionism in the state. Astor 
reasons that instead of enlisting for federal service, these white Kentuckians created slave patrols 
and guerrilla groups to thwart federal efforts to recruit blacks.9 Again, this claim rests on the 
assumption that Kentucky maintained healthy reserves of manpower throughout the war but 
simply redirected them from the Union war effort to patrolling its slave population. 
Patrick Lewis, author of For Slavery and Union: Benjamin Buckner and Kentucky 
Loyalties in the Civil War, correspondingly presents the argument that emancipation and black 
recruitment reduced unionism in Kentucky. Following the account of a slave-holding aristocrat 
who joined the Twentieth Kentucky Volunteer Infantry as a Union officer, Lewis maintained that 
Benjamin Buckner serves as a representative model for the rest of Kentucky. Similar to Crane 
and Astor, Lewis provides insightful and well-supported arguments which reasoned that the 
state’s loyalty to the Union waned as a result of emancipation and black recruitment. Although 
these measures disenchanted Buckner, who ultimately resigned his commission and began 
associating himself with rebel sympathizers, they did not encourage him to become openly 
                                                          
8 Crane, "The Demise of Slavery on the Border,” 637. 




hostile to the Union.  His regiment, which Lewis mentioned as being “more problematic” than 
other Kentucky regiments, fulfilled the rest of its service fighting rebel guerrillas in Kentucky.10 
Although Lewis includes some good analysis of Kentucky’s recruitment and how it decreased 
after 1864, he did not consider the potential for military exhaustion. 
Whereas Crane, Astor, and Lewis focused primarily on Kentucky slavery, other scholars 
such as Bridget Ford measured multiple factors to comprehend the state’s loyalty. Interested 
more in Kentuckians’ religious, racial, and political identity, Ford reasons that longstanding 
regional relationships between Cincinnati, Ohio and Louisville, Kentucky, ultimately led 
Kentuckians to believe their best interests lay with the North and the broader Union. Stressing 
that Northern and Republican influences infiltrated the slave state through Louisville, making it 
the South’s only “epicenter for abolition,” Ford concludes this association ultimately helped 
garner acceptance for black recruitment in Kentucky.11 However, Ford’s argument did not factor 
the state’s high service record to the Union army as a form of loyal resistance to abolition. 
Though Northern and Republican influence helped stymie resistance in Kentucky to anti-slavery 
sentiment, one must consider that the state’s reluctant acceptance of black recruitment may 
equally have come as a result of having already exhausted all other options. 
Similar to Ford, Luke Harlow’s Religion, Race, and the Making of Confederate Kentucky, 
1830-1880, examined multiple components to gauge Kentucky’s commitment to slavery. 
Focusing on associations between evangelical Christianity and slavery, Harlow argues that 
Kentucky, although relatively moderate compared to the slave states of the Deep South, 
remained religiously committed to the institution.12 Harlow reasoned that although Kentucky’s 
                                                          
10 Lewis, For Union and Slavery, 112. 
11 Ford, Bonds of Union, 411. 




moderate cultural markers fostered compromise and unionist sentiment, Kentuckians’ religious 
convictions nonetheless displayed their resolve to preserve slavery. Developing an argument 
similar to Crane, Astor, Lewis, and Ford, Harlow emphasized slavery as the primary component 
of the state’s unionism. Consequently, when the federal government introduced emancipation 
and black recruitment in 1863, Harlow contends that their religious, as well as economic 
devotion to slavery, ultimately encouraged many to associate with the Confederate cause after 
the war. 
While many scholars have argued that Kentucky’s loyalty tangentially decreased with 
emancipation and black recruitment, other historians have argued that the state remained 
steadfast in its commitment to the Union. William C. Harris noted how “a strong resistance arose 
in Kentucky” after the federal government sanctioned black recruitment.13 Although Kentuckians 
generally detested abolition, Harris argued that the broader white population was still willing “to 
make the necessary sacrifices to preserve the Union.”14 However, Harris did not closely examine 
the state’s fluctuating recruitment trends and instead relied primarily on public sentiment and 
political events to prove this point. Although well supported with evidence, a close examination 
of Kentucky’s white troop numbers could strengthen such a claim. 
Correspondingly, Shae Smith Cox’s work argues that self-interest spurred Kentucky’s 
unionism. Instead of expressed notions of patriotism, which motivated other states such as 
Michigan and Wisconsin, Cox suggests that Kentucky’s close ties to both the North and the 
South encouraged a more temperate and delayed response to the war.15 Concentrating on the 
secession crisis of 1861, Cox maintains Kentucky’s equally lucrative trade relations with both 
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14 Harris, Lincoln and the Border States, 188. 




regions encouraged the state to remain neutral. Cox reasons that slavery spearheaded this desire 
as it served as the cornerstone of the state’s economic, political, and cultural identity. Attempting 
to ensure the stability of this institution, Kentucky eventually sided with the Union and the 
Constitution which the state felt could better ensure slavery’s future. 
The most recent scholarship on Kentucky emphasizes slavery as the primary motivator 
behind the state’s unionist loyalty. A mainstay of the state’s cultural, political, economic, and 
religious identity, all of these scholars argued that the institution had a direct and indirect impact 
on all Kentuckians and influenced the decisions they made throughout the war. Though some of 
these works allude to the state’s diminished white volunteerism as proof of waning loyalty, none 
directly analyzed recruitment. A close examination of this quantitative data reveals that 
Kentucky had already exhausted its white military-age males earlier in the war. Contextually, 
this fact is clear when one observes that by the start of 1864, the proportion of white military-age 
men in the military had outpaced Michigan and Wisconsin. In 1864, these two northern states 
had reserves of manpower that Kentucky did not. Accordingly, Kentucky’s diminished 
recruitment efforts were not necessarily the result of waning unionism, but rather an embodiment 
of its exhaustive recruiting efforts to sustain the Union and preserve slavery in the state. 
To prove that Kentucky had exhausted its manpower by 1863, this thesis employs a 
comparative methodology that uses digital tools to examine statistical data from all three states. 
The principle intent of this approach is to display the raw recruitment figures, provided by each 
state’s respective Adjutant General Reports and 1860 Census Records. The free states of 




found in the Census, compare closely to Kentucky’s.16 Utilizing these tools, this thesis aims to 
provide an in-depth analysis of Kentucky’s yearly recruitment trends compared to the similarly 
sized states of Michigan and Wisconsin. Consequently, measuring these states’ individual 
recruitment records help offer a basis for comparison that emphasizes Kentucky’s enlistments 
and its close ties to slavery. 
To provide a complete analysis of Kentucky’s white recruitment and compare it to the 
efforts of Michigan and Wisconsin, this thesis covers the war chronologically. Chapter one 
begins by examining Kentucky slavery during the antebellum period and ends with a 
comparative analysis that emphasizes how the state’s recruitment efforts in 1861 dwarfed those 
of Michigan and Wisconsin. Since the antebellum period, white Kentuckians, made up of both 
pro-slavery and free-labor proponents, developed an economic and cultural dependence on the 
institution. They sought stability, mutual cooperation, and an established national framework to 
preserve slavery indefinitely. Consequently, when the Confederacy invaded Kentucky in 
September of 1861 and threatened the stability of slavery in the state, Kentuckians’ enlisted in 
numbers that far outpaced their counterparts in Michigan and Wisconsin. The main objective of 
this chapter is to emphasize how Kentucky expressed its commitment to slavery through its 
proportionally high federal enlistment records. 
The second chapter focuses on recruitment in 1862 and how the announcement of the 
Emancipation Proclamation affected Kentucky unionism. During this year, volunteerism in 
Kentucky fell considerably compared to Michigan and Wisconsin. The waning recruitment 
stemmed from multiple reasons, including war weariness, Confederate recruitment, the 
                                                          




beginning of military exhaustion, and to an extent, emancipation. The fighting in Kentucky too, 
including Confederate invasions and intense guerrilla warfare, made the entire population 
witness to the war and may also have encouraged young men to remain at home and protect their 
families. The Emancipation Proclamation also may have affected this poor turn out. Although 
only meant to apply to rebelling states, it still made many white Kentuckians wary about how it 
would affect their control over their slave population. However, unionist Kentuckians generally 
remained steadfast in the belief that the Federal Government would still preserve slavery so long 
as they remained loyal. This chapter concludes by arguing that Kentuckians reluctantly accepted 
the Emancipation Proclamation as a means to defeat the rebelling states and restore stability to 
their institutions. 
Chapter three details how the federal enactment of black recruitment affected Kentucky’s 
recruitment efforts in 1863. Following the discussion of the state’s reluctant acceptance of 
emancipation in chapter two, this section details how white Kentuckians, though still acquiescing 
to the endeavor, sought to resist it by committing the last of their white manpower reserves to 
Union armies. Unlike Michigan or Wisconsin, which resorted to conscription and black 
recruitment to meet their troop quotas, Kentucky managed to meet its quota solely through 
volunteerism. Embodying their cherished desire to preserve and stabilize slavery, white 
Kentuckians seemed resolved to prevent slaves from entering the army. After considering the 
manpower of the state that fought for the Confederacy, the Union’s 1863 recruitment 
encompassed the final white men that the state could offer. Consequently, this chapter seeks to 
prove that for the remainder of the war, Kentucky would be unable to mobilize much in the way 




The final chapter of this thesis focuses on black recruitment in Kentucky during the last 
two years of the war. After comparing Kentucky’s white recruitment efforts to Michigan and 
Wisconsin, this section will show that Kentucky’s poor white recruitment returns in 1864 and 
1865 were not necessarily the result of disenchanted unionism but rather military exhaustion. 
While both Michigan and Wisconsin claimed healthy reserves of manpower late into the war, 
Kentucky had already expended its manpower. Consequently, white Kentuckians reluctantly 
accepted black volunteers as a means to fulfil their military obligations. This chapter emphasizes 
the argument that emancipation and black recruitment did not necessarily devastate unionist 
sentiment in the state as scholars suggest.  
Slavery, and the desire to preserve it, represented the primary component that motivated 
Kentucky’s unionism. Present from the foundation of the state in 1792 until the ratification of the 
Thirteenth Amendment in 1865, the economic and racial benefits white Kentuckians garnered 
from the institution influenced the state’s social and political character. Therefore, it is necessary 
to examine the roots of slavery in Kentucky to determine how it impacted its unionist sentiment 
and subsequent recruitment efforts. To do so, one must begin by evaluating slavery in Kentucky 









Kentucky’s Alliance with Slavery during 1861 
 In September of 1861, Kentucky recruited more Union soldiers than at any other time 
during the war. Coming almost five months after the conflict officially started, the slave-holding 
state outpaced the recruitment records of the comparatively populated states of both Michigan 
and Wisconsin. However, Kentucky’s enthusiasm did not solely stem from notions of 
patriotically defending the Union as it primarily did for Michigan and Wisconsin, but rather from 
a desire to ensure the internal stability of slavery. Although the state contained a strong and 
influential faction of free-labor ideologists, all equally enjoyed the social and racial stratification 
the institution afforded. The northern-inspired free-labor proponents condemned the institution 
as morally wrong and not as economically profitable as wage labor, but yet still feared abolition 
on the grounds that it promoted cultural and racial miscegenation. Some slave masters too often 
articulated that slavery was immoral and only economically valuable as an investment source, 
but were unwilling to forsake it for fears that it would disrupt the lucrative status quo. 
Consequently, an integrated character developed among white Kentuckians that noted the evils 
of slavery while simultaneously believing it to be an absolute necessity. It was an effort to 
preserve this valued institution which differentiated Kentuckians from their Northern neighbors. 
Slavery ultimately inspired Kentucky’s large recruitment efforts in 1861. 
Kentucky’s original settlers always maintained a close association with slavery. Although 
a mix of slave-holders and free-labor proponents, the state’s white inhabitants learned to cherish 
the institution during the antebellum period. Originally a part of Virginia, the state became a 
bastion of slavery almost as soon as the territory’s first white settlers arrived. Coming primarily 




the economic and racial stratifications of Southern society.1 However, because the state bordered 
Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, thousands of farmers and urban artisans also arrived from the North. 
These transplanted northerners similarly sought to influence the state’s character by developing 
free-labor farms and factories. 2 Although both of these ideologies seemed to conflict with one 
another, white Kentuckians of both persuasions managed to coalesce for the sake of mutual 
benefit. Slave masters, influenced by free-labor proponents, often implemented the task system 
and allowed their slaves to contract themselves out and earn some meager wages.3 Similarly, 
northern-born farmers and industrialists capitalized on this system whenever possible by 
employing these slaves for part-time work on their farms or in their factories.4  
 Kentucky’s integrated view of slavery during the antebellum period not only helped 
develop the state’s economy, but also its cultural character, which valued white superiority. 
Encompassing both slave holders and non-slave holders alike, all seemed to benefit from slavery 
as an institution premised on racial stratification.5 Both sides feared the prospect of rapid 
emancipation as they generally perceived African Americans as a potential threat to white racial 
purity and culture. Increasingly aware of this possibility, Kentucky’s legislature supported new 
state constitutional measures meant to ensure the stability of the institution within the state. In 
1799 and 1850 respectively, the legislature voted to permanently disfranchise the state’s 
relatively small free black, mulatto, and Native American populations and voted to make it 
illegal for the General Assembly to ever free slaves in Kentucky.6  Whether or not white 
                                                          
1 Robinson, Union Indivisible, 156. 
2 Gary R. Matthews, More American than Southern: Kentucky, Slavery, and the War for an American Ideology, 
1828–1861 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2014), 25. 
3 Tallant, Evil Necessity, 63. 
4 Mathews, More American than Southern: Kentucky, Slavery, and the War for an American Ideology, 100-102. 
5 Tallant, Evil Necessity, 218. 




Kentuckians owned slaves, they mutually enjoyed and supported the racial and cultural 
segregation it afforded them.7  
 The relationship Kentuckians had with slavery fostered a unique border culture within the 
state that differentiated them from both the South and the North. Including views from pro-
slavery advocates as well as free-labor proponents, white Kentuckians developed the stance that 
slavery was evil but necessary.8 Adhering to arguments posed by free-labor proponents, pro-
slavery sympathizers generally considered that the institution perverted white industriousness 
and economic progression. Perhaps more importantly, they detested the fact that it placed a 
perceived “inferior race” in close proximity to white inhabitants.9 This problem only increased 
between 1840 and 1860, as the Deep South’s cotton boom amplified demand for labor, causing 
the fiscal value of slaves to escalate. Subsequently, Kentucky utilized its recent 6.7 percent slave 
population growth to meet that demand.10  Although masters intended to remove these slaves 
from the state, their rising population still increased white Kentuckians’ anxieties about 
maintaining a white majority. Hoping to curtail the growing African American population, many 
white Kentuckians, including Henry Clay and Cassius Clay, turned to compensated emancipation 
and colonization as a potential solution. Intended to liberate and remove the slaves from the 
state, these measures enjoyed some limited success but largely failed by 1850 for lack of funding 
to compensate masters for their 210,000 slaves.11  
                                                          
7 Michigan and Wisconsin Democrats seemed to similarly appreciate slavery as a means to segregate whites from 
blacks. For more information see Thomas E. Rodgers, “Copperheads or a Respectable Minority: Current 
Approaches to the Study of Civil War-Era Democrats,” Indiana Magazine of History, 109 (June 2013), 114-146. 
8 Tallant, Evil Necessity, 100-101. 
9 Tallant, Evil Necessity, 82-87. 
10 Cox, “Kentucky’s Conflict as a Border State during the Secession Crisis,” 22-23. 




Consequently, the fear of racial and cultural miscegenation encouraged both pro-slavery 
and free-labor proponents to maintain slavery as a form of control. Generally adopting this view, 
Kentucky diverged from the Deep South’s understanding that slavery was a positive good but 
also from Northern Abolitionists who considered the institution a damning evil. Although the 
state had close cultural ties to the South and economic relations with the North, it never wholly 
belonged to either. Instead, this integrated approach embodied a broader border culture, 
observable in Delaware, Maryland, and Missouri, which encouraged Kentuckians to seek 
moderation between both sections to maintain the stability of slavery. 
 Because Kentucky’s views on slavery set it apart from both the South and the North, the 
state developed a political stance which sought to project mutual cooperation to the increasingly 
divided nation. In 1836, for example, Kentucky statesman Henry Clay helped develop what 
became the Whig Party. Established upon the tenets of deferring to Constitutional law to settle 
sectional disputes, the Whig Party platform reflected Kentucky’s moderate character.12 Not 
wishing to disrupt the lucrative ideological balance in the state, the Whigs offered a stable 
foundation for slavery by advocating for Constitutional law and the Union which had previously 
lent national legitimacy to the institution. This belief remained strong in Kentucky’s political 
identity even after the Whigs dissolved. During the 1860 election, instead of giving its electoral 
votes to either Southern Democrat John Breckinridge or Republican candidate Abraham Lincoln, 
both Kentuckians, the state voted for Constitutional Unionist John Bell.13 Although one might 
have reasonably expected Kentucky to be a political battleground state, where pro-slavery 
                                                          
12 Mathews, More American than Southern, 83. 
13 For more information on the 1860 Presidential election see Robinson, Union Indivisible. 151; Mathews, More 
American than Southern, 189. Kentuckians gave Bell 45 percent of their vote, Breckinridge got 36 percent, Northern 




advocates sided with the South and the free-labor proponents allied to the North, the state sought 
a nationalist option. 
Kentucky’s desire to remain impartial to sectional differences continued past the 
antebellum era to influence the state’s neutrality during the opening months of the war. Fearing 
the radical abolitionist wing of Lincoln’s Republican Party, but also wary of becoming the 
Confederacy’s border to a Union no longer encumbered by a Fugitive Slave Law, Kentucky 
chose the middle ground and declared neutrality. Between Lincoln’s election in 1860 to mid-
April 1861, eleven Southern slave-holding states seceded from the Union. Uncertain of a 
Republican Administration, the new Confederacy sent delegates to the Border States in the hopes 
of uniting the slave-holding South against the Union. However, when the delegates arrived, the 
Kentucky legislature refused to hear their pleas as they did not wish to “follow the sparks” of 
secession.14 This moderate approach applied to the Union as well. In April of 1861, Lincoln 
telegraphed Kentucky Governor Beriah Magoffin requesting him to raise four regiments. 
Magoffin refused on the premise that recruiting and deploying such troops “imperils that peace 
and tranquility, which…have been the paramount desire of this people.”15 Different from other 
states of the upper south, such as Virginia and Tennessee, Kentucky shared a large portion of its 
border with non-slaveholding states. Aware that civil war placed Kentucky on the frontline, 
Magoffin stated the state’s neutrality “preserv[ed] the peace and amity between the neighboring 
Border States on both shores of the Ohio” and protected the state from the “unnatural, horrid, and 
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lamentable strife.”16 Wanting neither Confederate nor Union armies to disrupt the stability of 
their state, Kentuckians maintained an official stance of neutrality. 
Although neutrality generally reflected the wishes of Kentucky’s civil body, there were 
still strong advocates that favored one side over the other. Prior to the outbreak of war, for 
example, Kentucky pro-slavery men organized the State Guard to patrol the state and return 
runaway slaves.17 However, under the guidance of Magoffin, believed to be a southern 
sympathizer himself, this unit grew in 1861 to over 4,000 men with the understanding that these 
generally “southern rights” men would defend the state from federal occupation.18 Fearing such a 
biased force might influence the politics of the state, Kentucky’s unionist legislature established 
the Home Guard to counter the State Guard and to fend off any Confederate incursions.19 
Although a little smaller, officially including 3,004 men, Kentucky’s various Home Guard 
militias still represented the strong unionist sentiment that existed in the state.20 The presence of 
such forces emphasizes that internal divisions did exist in the state and highlights the state’s dual 
associations with southern slavery and the Union. Magoffin expressed that the presence of both 
forces would hopefully make Kentucky “a successful mediator” and offer the state the means to 
“resist and prevent encroachment on her soil, rights, honor, and sovereignty, by either of the 
belligerent parties.”21 By counter-balancing the influence of the opposing sides, Kentucky 
maintained relative mutual cooperation and stability during the war’s first six months.  
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Kentucky’s stance of neutrality not only represented a desire to promote internal stability, 
but also embodied its devotion to law and an adherence to the decision of its state leaders. Intent 
on preserving slavery, the state had direct associations with the slave-holding Confederacy and 
an indirect reliance on Union laws, such as the Fugitive Slave Law, which afforded national 
legitimacy to the institution. Consequently, when war broke out in April of 1861, many 
Kentuckians wanted to observe “what kind of war bill” the “Black Republican Government at 
Washington” contrived before officially entering the war.22 Even the state’s Democratic papers, 
which described Lincoln’s call for 75,000 volunteers as “unwarranted,” reaffirmed they were 
“none the less loyal” and would not “take one step against… the Government.”23 Essentially 
mirroring Magoffin’s proclamation which determined that state forces would not make any 
“hostile demonstrations,” Kentuckians endeavored to adhere “strictly [to] self-defense alone.”24 
Of course, some Kentuckians left the state between April and September of 1861 to join 
Confederate units in Tennessee or Federal troops in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. Still, the broader 
public remained committed to neutrality.25 This emphasizes that the majority of white 
Kentuckians adhered to the laws of their state leaders and would not themselves invoke large-
scale instability by mobilizing troops within the borders of their own state. 
Kentuckians also hoped their impartiality would allow them to burnish their historic role 
as peacemakers between northerners and southerners. This role suited Kentucky’s civic ethos 
and was nothing new to the state. Since the antebellum period, the state had constantly 
endeavored to support unionist sentiment. This was evident during the 1832 nullification crisis in 
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which Henry Clay set aside political differences to support President Andrew Jackson’s hard line 
against South Carolina.26 Furthermore, this legacy continued into the 1850s as Henry Clay and 
his fellow Whigs advocated for the Compromise of 1850 to settle the issue over the westward 
expansion of slavery between the North and South. These “Clayite” politics encouraged 
moderation and seemed to continually influence Kentucky’s national stance.27 Even Kentucky’s 
Democrats, arguably the most sympathetic to secession, claimed they were “ready and anxious to 
mediate between the belligerents.” They stated that moderation allowed them the “right of 
friendly intercourse and trade with both sections” and to “preserve the internal peace and to 
secure the lives, liberty and property of the citizens of the State.”28 Meanwhile, the state’s more 
pro-Union advocates stated that “Kentucky, poised upon her own peerless manhood, will tread it 
with a firm and constant step” and be “both sober and brave…in this exciting and appalling 
juncture.”29  Kentuckians generally wanted to remain impartial during the early months of 
disunion and war to utilize their traditional moderate views to mediate and restore peaceful 
relations between the South and North. 
 Working against Kentucky’s desire to remain neutral was its strategic access to the Ohio, 
Mississippi, and Tennessee Rivers, as well as the Cumberland Gap which led to the Deep South. 
Not wishing to lose the chance of obtaining access, both the South and the North publicly 
respected the state’s neutrality. Reflecting Kentucky’s strategic importance, the Confederacy 
issued clear orders meant to prevent rebel incursions into the state.30 Lincoln too, understood the 
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importance of placating Kentucky and famously stated that “to lose Kentucky is nearly the same 
as to lose the whole game.”31 Similar to the Confederacy, Lincoln officially ordered federal 
troops not to enter the state. Such was the importance of Kentucky, that while the rest of the 
nation essentially had to pick a side, both the Confederacy and the Union respected Kentucky’s 
neutrality. However, that is not to say that both sides completely obliged Kentucky’s wishes. The 
Confederacy still secretly enticed thousands to enlist while the Union also secretly accepted 
Kentucky recruits and sent weapons to the pro-union Home Guard.32 These attempts by both 
sides to covertly exert influence emphasizes that the state was too important to remain unused 
indefinitely. Consequently, on 4 September 1861, Confederate General Leonidas Polk invaded 
Kentucky, effectively ending the state’s neutrality.  
General Polk’s invasion of Kentucky proved significant as it helped sway the state into 
the Union. Though not officially sanctioned by the Confederate government, Polk’s expedition 
sought to secure the strategic city of Columbus, obtain recruits, and to embolden Confederate 
sympathizers to push the state into secession.33 Although the occupation was successful for a 
time, and eventually sanctioned by the Davis administration, Polk’s operation was largely 
disastrous for the rebel cause.34 Not only did it give the pretext for Federal troops under General 
Ulysses S. Grant to enter Kentucky and occupy Paducah on 5 September, but the Confederate 
incursion pushed Kentucky into the Union.35 On 12 September, the state adopted a resolution 
                                                          
31 Abraham Lincoln to Orville H. Browning, September 22, 1861, Abraham Lincoln Papers (Washington D.C.: 
Library of Congress). 
32 William W. Freehling, The South vs. the South: How Anti-Confederate Southerners Shaped the Course of the 
Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 69, 72-73. 
33 Lowell Harrison, The Civil War in Kentucky (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2009), 12-13; Harris, 
Lincoln and the Border States, 107-108. 
34 For Jefferson Davis’s approval of the invasion after it occurred, see Craig, Kentucky Confederates, 141-42. 
35 Columbus was strategically important as its bluffs offered a commanding view of the Mississippi River and 




which specified that “the rights of [their] citizens have been grossly infringed by the so-called 
Southern Confederate forces” and that they should mobilize their militias and request “aid [and] 
protection against [the Confederate] invasion.”36 Although Polk successfully occupied 
Columbus, and later Bowling Green, unionist influence grew and after a month, the rebels 
withdrew to the southern portion of the state and established an illegitimate government in 
Russellville.37 
Further compounding the issue for the Confederacy was the fact that Polk’s invasion 
coincided with Lincoln revoking Union General John C. Frémont’s emancipation orders in 
Missouri. Originally enacted on 30 August 1861, although without any authorization from the 
administration, Frémont declared that the slaves of rebel masters in Missouri would be “free and 
forever discharged” from slavery.38 Deemed by Kentucky Democrats as “rushing over friends 
and enemies alike” and condemned by Union sympathizers who hoped that “those higher in 
authority than General Frémont… [would] repudiate the measure,” Kentuckians remained 
suspicious of Lincoln and the Union.39  Consequently, Frémont’s proclamation did much to upset 
white Kentuckians of both persuasions who sought to preserve slavery in their state.40 On 11 
September, perhaps seeing an opportunity to solidify Kentucky into the Union after Polk’s 
invasion, Lincoln invalidated Frémont’s orders which did much to placate Kentucky’s 
concerns.41 Facing invasion and no longer restrained by fears of abolition, Kentucky’s legitimate 
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government in Frankfort, on 12 September 1861, approved of General Grant’s occupation of 
Paducah and officially ended the state’s neutrality by allying with the Union. 
After declaring their allegiance to the federal government, Kentuckians expressed their 
desire to serve the Union by condemning Polk and the unreliable Confederacy. Motivated by 
Polk’s violation of their state’s sovereignty, many Kentuckians began to “ask whether he w[ould] 
aid the invaders of our soil, or…strike hands with his brethren and drive them back.”42 Calls 
began to appear for “people, whether belonging to organized companies or not, [to] concentrate 
with all possible despatch (sic) at the various camps and other military centres (sic) in possession 
of the state… to break like stars through the gloom that overhangs the Republic.”43 The 
enthusiasm displayed by Kentuckians immediately after Polk’s invasion embodied their 
antebellum desire to maintain a stable society and preserve slavery. To Kentuckians, Polk’s 
invasion represented “an atrocious attack upon the only sovereignty they (the Confederates) 
pretended to revere.”44 The Daily Louisville Democrat also commented on Polk’s invasion by 
arguing, “when Kentucky adopted her neutrality she did not consider it subject to the ‘military 
necessities’ of Tennessee, and will not allow them to remain. It is a ‘military necessity’ to 
Kentucky to drive them off.”45 Although the Confederacy was a self-proclaimed purveyor of 
states’ rights, it had displayed to Kentuckians their inability to inspire strict adherence to its 
principles by violating Kentucky sovereignty. 
Many Kentuckians, consequently, viewed the rebelling states as incapable of providing 
the stability necessary to maintain their ideological and economic balance. Even Democrats 
                                                          
42 Pemmtice, Henderson, and Osborne, Louisville Daily Journal, September 19, 1861. 
43 Pemmtice, Henderson, and Osborne, Louisville Daily Journal, September 19, 1861. 
44 Pemmtice, Henderson, Osborne, “The Civil War, its Nature and End,” Louisville Daily Journal, November 22, 
1861. 




warned that Jefferson Davis had “brok[en] his word” and concluded that although they could not 
“control the…Federal Government,” they still had “more influence with it that they (the seceded 
states) h[ad] with even their Southern Confederacy.”46 Conversely, that same paper argued a few 
days later, that while Lincoln had respected their neutrality, they felt he was “governed by a 
desire, while in preserving the Union, to keep the rights of the States and of the citizens 
secure.”47 Polk’s invasion disregarded state sovereignty and threatened Kentucky slavery by 
introducing war. These components, coupled with their strong economic ties and perhaps even a 
degree of patriotism, motivated Kentuckians to commit to the Union.  
A significant portion of Kentuckians though, sided with the Confederacy. Coming mainly 
from the western and central bluegrass regions, many in Kentucky sympathized with the 
Confederate cause. Venturing into Tennessee, these men quickly organized into regiments and 
mustered for service with the Confederacy.48 However, owing to a lack of documentary 
evidence, it is difficult to precisely determine the number of Kentucky’s Confederates. Scholars 
have only attempted to estimate the state’s war-time contribution to the Confederacy, ranging 
from 25,000 to 40,000 troops, but have not broken this number down by year.49 The reason for 
this may be a lack of sufficient documentation by the Confederate recruiting services during the 
early stages of the war. One piece of evidence of Confederate recruiting occurring in Kentucky 
in 1861 was the resignation of Simon Buckner and his southern-sympathizing State Guard. Wary 
of the loyalty of these militia men, Kentucky’s unionist legislature decided to cease funding the 
unit, demand they surrender their weapons, and make them take an oath of loyalty to the Union. 
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Responding to the legislature’s actions, Buckner and thousands of his fellow guardsmen joined 
the Confederacy during late July 1861.50 Writing from Camp Boone, Tennessee, William 
Withers perhaps alludes to these State Guardsmen when he wrote to Confederate Secretary of 
War Leroy Walker. Withers claimed in July, “at least 10,000 [Kentuckians] can be enlisted in 
40-60 days.”51 This number is conceivable, owing to the rage militare which encouraged 
enlistments, but there is insufficient complementary evidence to validate or disprove the 
estimate. What is certain, however, is that thousands of white Kentuckians departed for 
Confederate service during 1861. Although the majority of Kentuckians remained unionist, this 
faction of proactive Confederate sympathizers lowered the state’s broader manpower reserves. 
Kentucky still had thousands of men enlisting in federal service though and in order to 
properly organize them, the state, similar to the rest of the Union, utilized an enlistment process 
that generally relied on civilian and military agents to work in tandem. When the federal 
government issued a call for troops, the War Department assigned each state a quota based on its 
military-aged population. Once a state received its quota, the governor, adjutant general, and 
provost marshal worked together to assign each county a portion of the recruiting burden.  Local 
leaders and military recruiters then worked together to publicize the quota, raise bounties, and 
begin organizing the men.  Early in the war, local leaders often formed their own companies, 
took them to a federal recruiting depot, and mustered them into a regiment. Later in the war, and 
especially after the draft became effective in 1863, state and federal leaders directly recruited 
young men into service rather than have local leaders attempt to organize the troops themselves.  
Once a community recruited enough men to complete its quota, federal recruiters gathered the 
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men into a military camp, mustered them into active service, and then either organized them into 
a regiment or assigned them as replacements for veteran units. Throughout the war, this was the 
general recruitment process which Union troops from Kentucky, Michigan, and Wisconsin 
experienced. 
During the last four months of 1861, Kentucky enjoyed the largest recruitment surge it 
would have during the war. Motivated by a mutual desire to defend the state from war, preserve 
slavery, maintain economic ties to Northern industry, and perhaps patriotism, thousands of white 
Kentuckians volunteered for the Union army. According to the Adjutant General Report, a 
compilation of unit rosters and statistical military data assembled after the war, Kentucky 
conservatively furnished 32,756 white recruits between 12 September and 31 December 1861.52 
Based on its quota of 27,237, allotted them by the Federal Government in April of 1861, 
Kentucky furnished 5,519 men over its requirement.53 Having a military-age white population in 
1860 of 140,078, these Union recruits represent 23 percent of the state’s available manpower.54 
However, this is a conservative percentage that accounts for neither the Kentuckians estimated to 
have joined Confederate forces, nor those who enlisted in Union regiments in other states during 
neutrality.55 Compared to Michigan and Wisconsin, two states containing comparable white 
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populations to Kentucky, it is observable there was a stark contrast regarding their respective 
recruitment efforts.56 To explain this phenomenon, it is important to examine respective 
motivations behind each state’s enlistments.   
In Michigan, patriotism and a sense of duty to preserve the Union served as the primary 
encouragements for enlistment in 1861. Between April and the end of December, Michigan’s 
Adjutant General reported that the state enlisted 24,281 white men into federal service.57 Out of a 
population of 126,312 military-age white males in 1860, this figure represents roughly 19 
percent of its eligible manpower.58 Exceeding the quota of 21,357 troops, the Cass County 
Republican stated, “we fight [so] that the rebellion may be crushed—that the Union may be 
preserved, and that the hopes of the liberty-loving… may be realized.”59 Stated in August of 
1861, this statement reiterated that Michigan was enthusiastically recruiting for the purpose of 
defending the Union. Matching this spirit, the East Saginaw Courier, a Democratic paper, stated 
that “seventy thousand Democrats in the State of Michigan stand ready to-day to redeem her 
solemn pledge to sustain the Government.”60 Representing an embodiment of what James 
McPherson described as rage militaire, it seems that defending notions of country and the 
perceived ideals it represented, permeated the state.61 Although an exaggeration, as Michigan 
would not furnish 70,000 troops until 1864, the East Saginaw Courier’s claims still emphasizes a 
broader martial excitement which seemed to encourage many Michiganders to enlist. So long as 
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the federal objective was to preserve the Union, both Republican and Democratic Michiganders 
could draw on a common cause and enlist.62  
While patriotic devotion to the Union seemed to transcend political boundaries in 
Michigan, divisive issues pertaining to slavery still weighed on the state’s recruitment. Although 
Michiganders had given Lincoln 88,481 votes during the 1860 election, or 57 percent of their 
total ballots, Northern Democrat Stephen Douglas still received 65,057, or 42 percent.63 
Douglas’s platform, diverging from the Southern Democrats, emphasized the Union, but favored 
popular sovereignty to decide the westward expansion of slavery.64 Essentially, a large 
contingent existed in Michigan which did not favor Lincoln nor any policies that might abolish 
or interfere with slavery. Similar to white Kentuckians, many Democratic Michiganders 
expressed concern that Lincoln could transform the war into “a crusade against African 
slavery.”65 However, Democrats contended that as long as Lincoln “conduct[ed] the war upon 
humane, constitutional and non-partisan principles… a united nation will strengthen his arms; 
but the instant he abandons this high position, he will break the spell of patriotism, which has so 
far saved the Republic.”66 Fundamentally a form of conditional loyalty, Michigan’s Democrats 
seemed to partially align with their counterparts in Kentucky to prevent “turning loose upon our 
society four millions of irresponsible blacks.”67 Consequently, where a desire to maintain slavery 
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and the racial benefits it afforded seemed to encourage Kentucky volunteerism, it may have 
discouraged some recruitment in Michigan during 1861.68  
In Wisconsin, patriotic sentiment also encouraged Union enlistments, but unlike 
Michigan or even Kentucky, patriotism had a limit. In 1861, the state provided 22,625 white 
soldiers for federal service.69 Based on their 1860 population of 121,997, these recruits 
represented 18 percent of the state’s total manpower.70 The fact that Wisconsin had a lower 
proportional service record than either Kentucky or Michigan is not surprising.  By 26 November 
1861, the state’s governor, Alexander Randall, ceased all recruitment in the state after it had met 
its quota. Wisconsin’s Adjutant General reported the state no longer needed to recruit because 
Wisconsin had “completed the troops of that arm of the service needed by [the] Government for 
the present.”71 Although meeting its quota of 21,753, Wisconsin still failed to provide as many 
troops as Kentucky or Michigan both in number and in proportion to its overall population.72  
Although Wisconsin’s recruitment returns may indicate the state was complacent after 
meeting its quota, a closer examination of the state’s Democratic and Republican opinions 
convey that men from both parties were generally all willing to serve. Wisconsin could not have 
met its troop quota unless men from both political parties enlisted. Although 42 percent of 
Wisconsin’s ballot went for Stephen Douglas, while roughly 56 percent went for Lincoln, those 
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Democrats still seemed willing to volunteer for the Union.73 A Democratic newspaper, the 
Manitowoc Pilot, stated that “every Democrat who has enlisted in the war posess (sic) the 
courage and patriotism to fight under a partizan (sic) Republican Administration to sustain the 
Union.”74 Similarly, Republican newspapers such as the Watertown Republican declared, “let 
fifty such armies as the Federal forces now in the field be furnished…in the cause to finally 
make way for the triumphal car of freedom, rather than give way to the barbaric and Satanic 
hordes of Confederates.”75 It seems that patriotic fervor transcended political boundaries and 
encouraged both Democrats and Republicans to volunteer.  
Rufus Dawes’s post-war memoir further validates the claim that notions of patriotism 
motivated Wisconsin men to fight.  Dawes, a self-proclaimed abolitionist from Ohio, found 
himself in Wisconsin when the war broke out. Intent on capitalizing on the rage militaire that 
possessed the state, Dawes managed to recruit 100 men within five days, into what would 
become Company K of the Sixth Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry.76 Primarily made up of 
Democratic German and Irish immigrants, Dawes claimed their patriotic zeal and devotion to the 
Constitution earned them the title of the “unmercenary volunteers of 1861.”77 However, 
commenting on how his personal convictions regarding abolition partially encouraged his own 
enlistment, Dawes noted that such arguments did not resonate among his comrades who, either 
from objection or indifference, did not associate their enlistment with a greater cause of 
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abolition.78 Dawes’s account emphasizes that, despite the governor’s self-imposed recruitment 
restrictions, men from Wisconsin were eager to volunteer. Furthermore, his ability, as an Ohio 
abolitionist, to find common cause with Democratic immigrants and quickly enlist them into a 
company, exhibits the bipartisan nature of patriotism in Wisconsin. Although political divisions 
existed in the state, the fervor to defend the Union and the Constitution seemed to encourage the 
majority of its enlistments.  
Regardless of enlistment motives, the question still arises as to why Kentucky furnished 
proportionally more troops than either Michigan or Wisconsin. Whether it was because 
Democrats remained suspicious of abolitionists, a sense of complacency after filling quotas, or a 
combination of both, men from Michigan and Wisconsin enlisted in significantly lower numbers 
in comparison to Kentucky. Given that slavery was a corner stone of Kentucky’s economy, 
culture, and social stratification, one might reasonably assume the Border State had more in 
common with the Confederacy. Subsequently, it is perhaps surprising the state far exceeded the 
minimum quota which the federal government had given them in April. Observing this, 
Kentuckians themselves reported that “considering the circumstances under which Kentucky is 
placed, she has done better than any other State in the Union… she has in the field more than her 
quota called for… notwithstanding she was the last to enter the field.”79 Whereas patriotism 
seemed to be the primary motivator for Michigan and Wisconsin men, self-interest to maintain 
stability in the state appeared as the main enlistment incentive for Kentucky in 1861.80 
Confederate General Polk’s invasion threatened Kentucky’s societal stability which 
galvanized Kentuckians to enlist in large numbers. Unlike Michigan or Wisconsin, Kentucky had 
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a palpable reason to exhibit martial enthusiasm. With Confederate troops entering the state, 
articles appeared which stated that the Confederacy was attempting “to lay waste the homes of 
our people…because they remain[ed] steadfastly true to the Union [and] the Constitution.”81 
Kentuckians claimed that the Confederates intended to “subjugat[e] the freemen of Kentucky to 
the rule of King Jefferson Davis” and “disregard…[their] rights of property, life, and liberties.”82 
Furthermore, rebels confiscated, or “hired” thousands of Kentucky slaves to help construct their 
defenses around Columbus, Kentucky as well as Forts Henry and Donelson in Tennessee.83 
Consequently, Kentucky’s mobilization derived from a perceived need to protect personal 
interests, rather than simply abstract notions of patriotism. 
However, in Michigan and Wisconsin, self-interest under the mask of patriotism may also 
have encouraged enlistments. Similar perhaps to Kentucky, Michigan and Wisconsin had mutual 
desires to preserve their own internal stability and way of life. The difference, though, is while 
Kentucky associated that with slavery, Michigan and Wisconsin linked it with the Union. This is 
perhaps why Republicans and at least some Democrats found common cause as the Union 
broadly encompassed their respective interests. Secession threatened the economic and political 
benefits they derived from a united nation. In Michigan, for example, Democrats equated 
secession to “see[ing] the millions employed, now unemployed…their willing hands idle, their 
families struggling” while Republicans stated they wanted “a re-united and once more 
prosperous people.”84 Although such overtures also included enunciations of duty and honor, it 
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seems a self-interest to maintain their economic affluence helped encourage some of the patriotic 
expressions that encouraged enlistments.85 
Wisconsinites also seemed to utilize patriotism to mask their self-interest in preserving 
the Union. For example, Democratic immigrants reported that “under no circumstances would 
their condition be tolerable in a divided Confederacy.” Similarly, Republicans stated disunion 
invited “ruin” as it sets a “precedent… whereby they (the minority) may rightfully revolt when 
beaten at the polls.”86 Similar to Michigan, Wisconsin’s Democrats and Republicans alike may 
have blanketed their respective interests with abstract notions of national patriotism. Fearful 
perhaps of how disunion might affect their personal welfare, self-interest encouraged patriotic 
sentiment. Although such calls may have warranted the blind enlistment of some recruits, many 
men in both Michigan and Wisconsin seemed to have had more tangible and inclusive reasons to 
enlist. Consequently, they too sought economic and cultural stability. However, because they 
dwelled in free-states, they associated their affluence with free-labor and the Union instead of 
slavery.  
The desire to maintain slavery may have discouraged some Northern Democrats in 
Michigan and Wisconsin from volunteering. Although they did not necessarily have a direct 
relationship to the institution, many Northerners still enjoyed its perceived racial and cultural 
benefits. In newspapers from both states, Democrats proclaimed they did not want to disrupt 
slavery, which they viewed as a constitutional right of fellow citizens. Not willing to die for 
slaves, Michigan Democrats stated that the Constitution demands that “each State [should] 
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regulate its own affairs without interference” and Northerners should just “mind [their] own 
business and let the affairs of others alone.”87 Even though they did not own slaves or live in a 
state that supported the institution, many still viewed it as a valuable means to control and 
contain the African American population in the South. Wisconsin Democrats, meanwhile, wrote 
that slavery was necessary because it allowed whites to act as “the overseer for the future good 
behavior of the negro.”88 From these examples, many Michigan and Wisconsin Democrats did 
not want to interfere with the institution because of their Constitutional interpretations and their 
belief that it maintained white supremacy. This may have discouraged Michigan and Wisconsin 
Democrats who did not want to fight in a war that could potentially advance abolition. 
Consequently, the same desire to preserve slavery that motivated Kentuckians may have 
discouraged some Northern Democrats. 
Whether from abolitionist influences or because they were far from active military 
theatres, Michigan and Wisconsin did not recruit as many volunteers as Kentucky in 1861. 
Fearful that the chaos of war and the traversing of armies across their state would ultimately 
disrupt their slave society, Kentuckians decided to remain neutral. Already maintaining two 
militias with biases in favor of one side or the other, the state did not want civil war to destroy 
the tenuous balance established between pro-slavery and free-labor proponents during the 
antebellum period. Intent on preserving slavery, both for its economic flexibility as a labor 
source as well as an investment, and for the cultural supremacy it afforded whites, all white 
Kentuckians mutually enjoyed the institution’s perceived benefits. Evident from their newspaper 
articles, proclamations, and letters to President Lincoln, Kentuckians did not want any 
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disruptions in their state. They merely wanted to maintain the status quo until the rest of the 
nation could resolve its differences.  
However, Polk’s invasion threatened these hopes and ultimately encouraged thousands of 
white Kentuckians to enlist for the Union. Although thousands went to the Confederacy in 1861, 
the vast majority allied themselves to the federal cause. Unwilling to commit to a Confederacy 
which failed to control its generals and did not respect the state’s neutrality, Kentuckians viewed 
the rebel bureaucracy and command structure as disorganized and undependable. Consequently, 
the state decided to ally with the federal government which, although it was secretly breaching 
its neutrality by recruiting and arming Kentucky unionists, had not wantonly violated neutrality. 
Lincoln was all too aware of the state’s vital importance and issued strict orders to his 
commanders not to disturb the state’s neutrality. Furthermore, Lincoln paid special attention to 
Kentucky’s interests by revoking General Frémont’s unauthorized order to free the slaves of 
rebel masters in Missouri. This, coupled with Lincoln’s promise that the war’s purpose was to 
preserve the Union and the Constitution, motivated Kentucky unionism. 
During the following four months, between September and December, Kentucky enjoyed 
its highest recruitment record in the war. Far outpacing Michigan and Wisconsin, Kentuckians 
quickly mobilized and mustered 29 regiments of infantry and cavalry, three artillery batteries and 
an engineering company all for three-year terms in federal service.89 Encompassing over 32,000 
troops, Kentucky far exceeded its quota and significantly reinforced Union troops as they pushed 
the Confederates, and many of Kentucky’s secession sympathizers, to the southern portion of the 
state. Intent on maintaining slavery and the economic and racial benefits it afforded, these 
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Kentuckians viewed the Union as the best catalyst to ensure the continued existence of the 
institution in the state. Effectively, Kentucky’s huge troop surge in 1861 cemented its support for 
the Union.  
 
This graph shows Kentucky’s relative recruitment compared to Michigan and Wisconsin for 1861.90 
 
Even though Kentucky was a slave state that had arguably more to lose by allying with 
the Union, it still furnished more troops than either Michigan or Wisconsin. Although both of 
these states met their respective quotas, their recruitment efforts, which spanned almost nine 
months, failed to compare to Kentucky’s. Representing two states which voted Republican in the 
1860 election and shared many economic and cultural characteristics with the rest of the northern 
Union, they did not directly face the same threats to their internal security and stability as 
Kentucky. Located in the far North and surrounded by friendly states, neither Michigan nor 
Wisconsin faced any serious threat of invasion. Furthermore, Michiganders and Wisconsinites 
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may have also felt that after meeting their quotas, they had concluded the need to recruit any 
further. 
The only other explanation for why Michigan and Wisconsin did not provide as many 
troops as Kentucky, lies in the absence of slavery. Both states were predominately white and 
contained very small free-black populations. Consequently, they did not necessarily view slavery 
as a detriment to their economic and cultural characters. Effectively, most remained indifferent 
to whether or not slavery continued to exist.  Their sole purpose was to restore the Union under 
which they had previously prospered. Although Democrats in both states expressed their 
sympathy for slavery, both as a Constitutional right as well as a perceived means to maintain 
white supremacy, they did not have a direct stake in it. Instead, they expressed abstract notions 
such as patriotism as a means to maintain the status quo which had thus far proved beneficial. 
Although abhorring secession, many Democrats may have feared the prospect of how an 
abolitionist war would negatively affect their cherished Union and may have refused to volunteer 
as a consequence. 
Regardless of the reasons, Kentucky furnished more troops in a shorter amount of time 
than their similarly populated counterparts in Michigan and Wisconsin. Motivated primarily by 
fears of racial amalgamation and internal strife, Kentuckians enlisted in large numbers to defend 
the Union, as well as slavery. However, in 1862, Kentucky faced two major issues which would 
further complicate these intentions: further internal instability and the preliminary Emancipation 
Proclamation. Determined to defend the Union but suspicious of emancipation, Kentucky would 





The Threat of Abolition and Kentucky’s Loyalties in 1862 
 In January of 1862, Kentuckians were optimistic about the coming campaigning season. 
After driving out Confederate forces and recruiting thousands of men into the federal army 
during the previous year, Kentuckians felt that the Union was poised to defeat the rebellion. 
However, as the year progressed and the war continued, white Kentuckians became distressed 
about how a prolonged civil war could affect their state. Concerns regarding casualties, invasion, 
guerrilla fighting, and especially the increasing influence of abolition, weighed heavy on the 
Border State. Consequently, many historians have argued that unionist Kentuckians lost interest 
in enduring these hardships as they feared their sacrifices were abetting abolitionism.1 Ascribing 
Kentuckians’ lower morale and faltering recruitment to the preliminary Emancipation 
Proclamation, researchers have generally claimed that by late 1862, Kentuckians’ loyalty to the 
Union had subsided. 
Although such scholarly claims are well-supported and reasonable, they do not closely 
contextualize Kentucky’s ability to recruit in 1862. After considering the huge recruitment surge 
of 1861, coupled with the men lost to Confederate recruiters, the state’s quota, premised on its 
population in 1860, was too high. Furthermore, the state suffered from insurrectionary and 
conventional conflict, which encouraged many potential recruits to remain at home and protect 
their property instead of enlisting in federal service. Considering these factors, one could 
conclude that although Kentucky recruited significantly fewer troops, especially compared to 
Michigan or Wisconsin, war weariness and emancipation did not necessarily hinder unionist 
                                                          




recruitment. Rather, Kentucky’s reduced volunteerism reflected the beginnings of military 
exhaustion. 
Unlike Kentucky, Michigan and Wisconsin maintained large reserves of manpower they 
could draw upon for recruits in 1862. Unaffected by internal warfare or Confederate recruiting, 
these two states arguably had a more fixed population and a dependable infrastructure for 
recruitment. Relying heavily on state bounties and the threat of a draft, both Michigan and 
Wisconsin were able to provide thousands more troops than Kentucky. However, concerns over 
high casualties and political partisanship regarding the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, 
weighed on these states and negatively affected their recruitment. Even though Michigan and 
Wisconsin contained more eligible men than Kentucky, these concerns helped prevent both of 
these states from meeting their respective quotas. After comparing the proportional recruitment 
efforts of these three states, it is evident that despite war weariness or fears of abolition, 
Kentucky still remained committed to preserving slavery and the Union. 
 In early 1862, Kentuckians remained hopeful that the war would end quickly. Following 
the state’s massive recruitment efforts during the previous year, coupled with the entry of Union 
troops into the state, many Kentuckians felt that the war would conclude relatively quickly. In 
February, commenting on the size and training of the federal government’s armies, the Louisville 
Daily Democrat stated, “the re-establishment of the Union is no longer a question of doubt in the 
mind of the people. After trial and preparations, at length we can see the sunlight shining through 
the rift clouds, and lighting all the land.”2 Furthermore, in March, after discussing Union 
preparations to advance on Corinth, Mississippi, General Burnside’s victory at Newbern, and 
                                                          




Commodore Samuel DuPont’s retaking of Fort Marion in Florida, the Lexington Observer and 
Reporter expressed optimism for the coming year. The newspaper claimed that after such 
successes, “the progress of the armies of the Republic is onward, and the rebellion under their 
vigorous and well directed blows is reeling and tottering to its fall.”3 Heading into the major 
military campaigning seasons of the spring and summer months, white Kentuckians generally 
seemed assured the Union would prevail. 
Kentuckians’ optimism though, did not translate into significant Union volunteers in 
1862. The state’s Adjutant General, D.W. Lindsey, placed the state’s total contribution for the 
year at 12,717 troops.4 Out of a total quota of 29,810, one can see Kentucky had fallen well 
below its federal requirement.5 However, according to a letter written to the Adjutant General of 
the United States Army, Lorenzo Thomas, on 21 December 1863, John Boyle, Kentucky 
Adjutant General between 1863 and 1864, concluded that the state’s 1862 quota had been 
incorrect. He argued that “the calls for troops by the General Government of 1861 and 1862,” 
established from the 1860 Census, had not “deducted [the] 17,000 men —the number supplied 
from the best data at command, to have originally joined the rebel armies.”6 These 17,000 
Kentuckians, whom Boyle calculated had left for the Confederacy between 1861 and 1862, 
represent the difference between Kentucky’s furnished troops and its quota.7  
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Although Boyle’s simple assertion that Kentucky’s missing recruits were in Confederate 
forces is convenient, it is not wholly inconceivable. The federal government’s use of the 1860 
Census to determine quotas worked relatively well for the northern states but had no means to 
accurately adjust for the Border States who lost potential recruits to the South. Rebel recruitment 
may also have negatively affected Missouri and Maryland as they too fell short of their 1861 and 
1862 quotas by 12,520 and 19,701 respectively.8 Furthermore, it is also possible that from April 
of 1861 to the end of 1862, 17,000 Kentuckians joined Confederate forces.9 Given the estimate 
provided by Confederate officials that approximately 10,000 Kentuckians had enlisted by July of 
1861, it is conceivable that a further 7,000 enlisted during August of 1861 to December of 1862. 
Kentucky newspapers commented on this in September by stating that “there are many of the 
Secesh making their way to the Confederate forces to fight against the State.”10 Assuming then 
this number is plausible, one can see that although producing 50 percent fewer federal troops in 
1862, 48 percent of the state’s military-age population was already in uniform, of which 32 
percent were in Union armies.11 Consequently, Kentucky had a smaller population to draw upon 
for Union recruits which the United States War Department had not considered when 
determining Kentucky’s quota. 
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Regardless of Kentucky’s quota issues, the state still did not furnish many volunteers and 
a potential reason may be because high casualties and military setbacks discouraged enlistments, 
an issue that affected recruitment in all states. Kentuckians increasingly expressed concern that 
the war continued despite their personal sacrifices. After enduring a Confederate invasion, and 
suffering internal disruptions as armies traversed their state and thousands of their young men 
left to fight for both sides, Kentuckians grew anxious for peace and stability.12 Viewing George 
B. McClellan’s failure on the Peninsula and John Pope’s defeat at Second Bull Run, Kentuckians 
stated “let’s have no more surprises. We have men enough to surprise the enemy and we have 
had experience enough to teach us vigilance. Don’t let any officer who is responsible for his own 
position tell us he was... surprised at all.”13 The federal casualties and military setbacks though 
posed a direct threat to Kentucky as it hampered recruitment and left the state vulnerable to 
another invasion. The Daily Commonwealth stated “if we do not fill up our regiments…our 
hearths will be a blackened heap of desolation, and our field the spoil of the ravisher.”14 
Emphasizing the state was not obtaining enough recruits to thwart an impending invasion, it 
seemed that war weariness regarding military setbacks may have impeded volunteerism in the 
state and left it largely unprotected. Whereas General Polk’s 1861 incursion helped motivate 
recruitment, it may be that after almost a year of conflict many white Kentuckians felt more 
inclined to remain at home to secure their personal property instead of enlist. 15 
During the Confederate invasion of 1862, Kentuckians largely failed to enlist into federal 
service as they had in 1861. The attack itself, spearheaded by two Confederate armies under the 
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command of Braxton Bragg and Edmund Kirby Smith, began on 29 August 1862 with the Battle 
of Richmond, Kentucky and concluded after the 8 October 1862 Battle of Perryville.16  
Occurring in conjunction with Robert E. Lee’s assault into Maryland, the South hoped to push 
Kentucky into the Confederacy and hopefully obtain thousands of new recruits.17 During this 
campaign, rebel forces defeated Union troops at Richmond and Munfordville and captured the 
cities of Lexington and Frankfort where they illegitimately established Richard Hawes as 
governor.18  
Despite the setbacks, Kentuckians still implored their men to volunteer. Calls appeared in 
the papers stating, “To Arms! To Arms... The state has been invaded by an insolent foe; her 
honor insulted; her peace disturbed, and her integrity imperiled…. I appeal to you, as 
Kentuckians…to rise in majesty of your strength, and drive the insolent invader... from your 
midst.”19 As recruitment data shows, though, such appeals did not seem to motivate Kentuckians 
to enlist in federal ranks as they had during the previous year. Even among the men who did 
volunteer as a result of the invasion, “hundreds deserted from Buell’s army” and were “now at 
home, dressed in citizens’ cloths, apparently without any intention of returning.”20 After the 
campaign ended and the emergency abated, many Kentuckians seemed more interested in 
remaining at home than serving for extended periods of time.  
The apparent desire among Kentuckians to remain at home, though, indirectly still 
connected them to the Union. Although many white Kentuckians did not enlist in federal forces, 
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they did not volunteer for Confederate service either. This is an important component as the 
prospect of obtaining thousands of new recruits had helped incentivize Confederate forces to 
enter the state in the first place.21 Kentucky Democrats, arguably the most sympathetic to the 
Confederate cause, stated that the rebels “suffered by meddling with this State, and their manifest 
destiny is to suffer still more by the same policy” as Kentuckians “would be glad to be let alone 
by them.”22 This lack of support was one of the reasons, aside from the military draw at 
Perryville, which ultimately encouraged Generals Bragg and Smith to vacate the state.23 
Consequently, one could argue that those white Kentuckians who did not enlist for the Union 
indirectly helped dispel the rebels by not volunteering for their armies.  
The strong presence of Confederate guerrillas also may support the theory that white 
Kentuckians remained at home to secure their property rather than enlist in federal or even state 
forces. Often, retreating armies left behind “desperate bands,” who preyed upon the civilian 
population. Consequently, many families of serving soldiers encouraged their men to desert to 
protect and sustain the family.24 During 1862, news of rebel insurgents appeared in many 
Kentucky newspaper articles. The Louisville Daily Democrat stated that these marauders do “an 
immense amount of damage” while the Daily Commonwealth wrote that these guerrillas “are 
traitors and rebels against the United States....who would murder every neighbor” and “should be 
hunted by blood hounds, if necessary, and shot without mercy.”25 Even Governor Magoffin, a 
suspected southern sympathizer, condemned guerrilla action by stating in a Proclamation how 
“almost every neighborhood [was] threatened with civil strife, with dangerous combinations of 
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bad men, forming in different sections of the State, to frighten, rob… [and] to murder the good 
citizens of the Commonwealth.” Magoffin directly addressed Confederate Colonel John Hunt 
Morgan as having “forcibly seized and carried away a large amount of valuable property 
belonging to the Government and private citizens.”26 It seems that federal forces within the state, 
and even the Home Guard, except in parts of Mercer and Boyle Counties, could not expel these 
guerrilla forces.27 Accordingly, the Confederate Kentucky campaign, coupled with insurgent 
forces within the state, may have discouraged federal recruitment by convincing Kentucky men 
they needed to protect their homes and families. 
Attempting to revitalize volunteerism, Kentucky turned to federal bounties and the threat 
of a state draft. By late summer and into the fall, Kentucky’s legislature passed a draft bill which 
granted the state authority to conscript men for military service. Leaving “few or none exempt,” 
state officials claimed, “there is yet time for Kentucky to fill her quota” and implored their young 
men to enlist and “not only get their bounty, but save themselves from the disgrace of a draft.”28 
Newspapers increasingly advertised how “any person enlisting in the armies of the United 
States…. [received a] total payment in advance, $40” with an additional “$75 bounty paid upon 
the expiration of the term of service.” 29 Despite Kentucky’s reduced volunteerism, many of the 
state’s recruitment posters did not include additional state or local bounties, as had often 
appeared in Michigan and some Wisconsin advertisements. Although some individual units such 
as Colonel Woodruff’s Regiment offered an upfront “bounty of $90,” most of Kentucky’s 
regiments seemed to rely solely on the federal government’s offer of $40 with a $75 reward at 
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the end of service. Adjutant General D.W. Lindsey even stated how proud Kentuckians were that 
they did not utilize “the mercenary purchased by [an] excessive State or local bounty, but with 
citizens prompted by patriotism.”30 Kentucky locals did not need additional state or local 
bounties as its volunteer record show the state procured troops without having to rely on 
financial incentives. Considering the other factors of high casualties, military setbacks, and 
guerrilla fighting in the state, the lack of additional bounties may have encouraged many to stay 
at home to ensure financial stability for their families. 
Intent on bolstering Union armies, Congress legalized African American recruitment 
much to the dismay of white Kentuckians. Introduced on 17 July 1862 under the Militia Act, the 
federal government granted authority to local commanders to utilize contraband slaves by 
officially freeing and inducting them into their respective commands. Although principally 
confined to the Union-occupied regions of the South, white Kentuckians noted the threat it posed 
to the institution of slavery and criticized the measure whenever possible. Commenting on 
General David Hunter’s organization of black combat troops in South Carolina, Kentuckians 
remarked how his “black brigade has fizzled” as “four hundred of them deserted and returned to 
their masters.”31 Aside from emphasizing their perception that black soldiers were inferior to 
whites, many Kentuckians also claimed it was unfair to place former slaves into combat. 
Alluding to the war’s hardships, the Louisville Daily Democrat asked why Republicans would 
“subject the black race to an indiscriminate butchery, and defeat infallibly the cherished object—
the restoration of the Union.” The article concluded by arguing “we shall make this a war for 
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white men, and see if it doesn’t do better.”32 Because Kentuckians abhorred black recruitment, 
they were still willing to commit their white men to serve in Union armies. 
Lincoln attempted to placate the Border States’ concern regarding the stability of slavery 
by offering compensated emancipation. Initially introduced on 16 April 1862, the plan freed the 
slaves in Washington D.C. by compensating masters $300. Expanding from this relative success, 
Lincoln attempted to apply compensated emancipation to the rest of the Border States and 
allocated funding to pay loyal masters $200 in exchange for each slave they freed.33 However, 
fearing the prospect of a free black population, Kentuckians insisted it was better “to keep the 
negroes in slavery rather than let them loose” as compensated emancipation “would ruin the 
whole country.”34 Similarly other Kentuckians felt “Abolitionist[s]….would lie out of any pledge 
they might give” and that “no border States are deluded by it [as] they know it is a cheat.”35 
Although compensated emancipation worked in Washington D.C., Kentucky remained 
suspicious of abolitionist intent and feared the possibility of a free African American population. 
As a result, Kentucky refused the federal government’s initial attempts to purchase the freedom 
of its slaves.36 
The final component which may have hampered Kentucky’s willingness to volunteer was 
the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. Released after the battle of Antietam on 22 
September 1862, but not effective until the first of January 1863, the preliminary Emancipation 
Proclamation rejuvenated Kentucky’s fears about an abolitionist war. A month prior to its 
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release, Kentuckians expressed their anxiety that Lincoln might interfere with slavery. The 
Louisville Daily Democrat stated, “Kentucky does not expect her loyalty rewarded by a 
disturbance of her social condition. She only claims the right which all the States have, to fix the 
status of the black race within her borders.” The newspaper argued that “the free States, as well 
as the slaves States, claim and exercise this right… [and] that the negro has no rights that the 
white man is bound to respect.”37 Furthermore, the newspaper reasoned, “whoever is for 
converting this war, directly, or indirectly, into a crusade for the Abolition of Slavery, is an 
Abolitionist of the worst sort.”38 Although the Emancipation Proclamation exempted the loyal 
Border States, these newspaper articles expressed the state’s concern regarding how the measure 
would impact Kentucky slaves.  
During this time, hundreds if not thousands of Kentucky slaves fled their masters for 
Union lines.39 Advertisements in newspapers increasingly appeared calling for the return of 
young male escaped slaves, and began stating that the North “will soon be flooded with the 
runaways.”40 The frequency of such notices at this particular time, and the fact that some editors 
devoted whole columns to the issue, may personify how the preliminary Emancipation 
Proclamation encouraged many young male slaves to run away to Union camps. Although not all 
of the Union regiments these escaped slaves approached accepted them, those that did often 
employed them as military laborers.41 Concerned about this matter, many locals insisted that “the 
army in Kentucky must be used for the return of runaway negroes” and halt their “operation of 
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negro stealing.”42  Such actions undermined the institution and, as these articles testify, outraged 
many white Kentuckians. Consequently, out of an interest to secure their property and maintain 
control over the African American population, many Kentuckians may have decided to protect 
the home front instead of enlisting. 
Of those Kentuckians who were already serving, some resigned after the preliminary 
Emancipation Proclamation, but the majority remained in uniform. When President Lincoln 
released his plan for emancipation, Kentucky had 42,266 Union troops in the field.43 Of this 
number, at least 4,142 men, or nine percent, deserted.44 Reported by the Adjutant General, this 
number is perhaps misleading as it represents the desertion record of these particular units for the 
entire war; not solely 1861 to 1862. Furthermore, it is impossible to determine if emancipation 
motivated these desertions as the military defeat at Fredericksburg may have affected Union 
desertion rates as well.45 Although scholars have provided examples in which individuals and 
units threatened to mutiny because of emancipation, such as Benjamin Buckner and the 20th 
Kentucky Infantry, these seem to be the exception rather than the rule.  
Although Buckner and many of his comrades were concerned with the preliminary 
Emancipation Proclamation, their actions did not embody the general consensus of Kentucky’s 
other field units. Even if many of the state’s other soldiers felt the same, Buckner and his 
comrades were especially problematic compared to other Kentucky units. Because of the 
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regiment’s protests and threats of resignation, General William S. Rosecrans reassigned 
Buckner’s regiment from frontline service to garrison duty in Kentucky.46 However, despite the 
reassignment, and the fact that Buckner and many of his fellow officers ultimately resigned, they 
still remained loyal to the Union. While back in Kentucky, and prior to leaving the service, the 
20th Kentucky fought against John Hunt Morgan’s raiders and worked to protect the state from 
other Confederate guerrillas.47 Even after he resigned, Buckner claimed that he still favored the 
Union and abhorred secession.48 Overall, most of Kentucky’s troops seemed content to stay in 
service despite any personal objections to emancipation. There were no major reports of mutiny 
or mass desertion among the state’s deployed troops and even those who protested generally still 
detested the Confederacy and secession.  
Kentucky’s recruitment records, coupled with the retention of most of its field troops, 
emphasizes that the state’s unionists generally accepted the preliminary Emancipation 
Proclamation as a means to conclude the war more quickly. However, dissenters did exist in 
Kentucky as this abolitionist federal policy encouraged a surge of Confederate guerrilla activity 
in the state.49 Although unhappy about the negative implications the Emancipation Proclamation 
would have, Kentuckians still expressed the belief that the Union was the best means to preserve 
slavery. Maysville’s Dollar Weekly Bulletin stated that those in favor “for the Constitution as it is 
and the Union as it was… [are] truly loyal citizens, whether he fights Secession rebels in the 
field or Abolition rebels at the Ballot box.”50 Kentuckians appeared to cherish the stability of the 
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Union as they believed that their continued loyalty meant they still had a voice in affecting 
federal policy regarding slavery.  
Furthermore, one could even argue that the threat of emancipation may also have 
encouraged unionist sentiment in the state. Kentuckians expressed that if “the struggle between 
the two parties now in arms should be prolonged, if the solution of their great debate should yet 
be delayed, evils of another kind may possibly arise.”51 Fearing the prospects of an effective 
Emancipation Proclamation, white Kentuckians endeavored to strengthen their commitment to 
the Union to bring a quick conclusion to the war. During the final three months of 1862 for 
example, Kentucky raised 25 percent, or 3,207 men, of its total recruits for that year.52 Although 
the state still fell short of its quota, these final three months were some of Kentucky’s most 
productive regarding recruitment. This fact, coupled with the argument that most of Kentucky’s 
field troops remained loyal to the Union, may imply that emancipation coincidently motivated 
Kentucky’s pro-slavery unionism. The Louisville Daily Democrat stated at this time “we have 
more loyal men in Kentucky than there are in any free state: for we have a majority of two or 
three to one who will never let the Union slide by their consent.”53 It seems then that 
Kentuckians, although unhappy about the Emancipation Proclamation, still favored the Union in 
the hopes of winning the war before Republicans could radicalize it any further. 
Although Kentucky failed to meet its quota, the state still remained committed to the 
Union. By the end of 1862, Kentucky had 45,473, or 32 percent of its total eligible manpower, 
serving in Union ranks. Coupled with the men who left for service in Confederate armies, 
                                                          
51 Ross and Rosser, “Suggestion of a Difficulty,” and “The Enfranchisement of the Slaves,” (Maysville, Kentucky) 
Dollar Weekly Bulletin, November 27, 1862. 
52 I determined this number by adding the troops from the 11th Cavalry (1,280), 14 Cavalry (1,296), and the 15th 
Cavalry (631), all of which the state organized between late September 1862 to December 1862. 




assuming the Adjutant General’s estimate of 17,000 rebel Kentuckians is accurate, 48 percent of 
the state’s military-age population was in uniform by the end of 1862.54 Aside from war 
weariness and the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, this high-performance record may be 
the primary reason for the state falling so short of its quota. After considering Kentucky’s 
recruitment data, coupled with its newspaper articles, the majority of the state still remained 
committed to the Union despite providing significantly lower number of troops in 1862. 
Comparatively, Michigan had a larger available population in 1862 and was able to 
recruit slightly more troops than Kentucky. During the previous year, Michigan enlisted only 19 
percent of its available manpower for the Union army, as opposed to Kentucky’s 23 percent, 
which allowed them a better opportunity to recruit.55 Subsequently, Michigan slightly 
outdistanced Kentucky by recruiting 15,895 troops in 1862.56 Bringing its total proportional 
service record to 31 percent, Michigan had committed a significant portion of its manpower to 
the Union cause. However, after considering the state’s quota of 23,372, one can see it still fell 
short by 7,477 men.57 Unlike Kentucky, which blamed its diminished volunteerism on 
Confederate recruiting, Michigan had no such excuse. Instead, Adjutant General Jno. Robertson 
argued that “precarious” relations with the Indians, coupled with “the then disturbed state of the 
frontier counties” have caused communities such as “Gratiot, which months ago had furnished 
twelve more than its quota” to fail its recruitment requirements.58  
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 Michigan’s newspapers, though, seem to invalidate Robertson’s claims that Indian 
troubles subverted the state’s recruiting efforts in 1862. For example, the East Saginaw Courier, 
on 10 September reported on various rumors of Indian forces ranging in size from a couple 
hundred to over 2,000, “encamped at various points in the Saginaw Valley.” Located less than 50 
miles away from Gratiot County, this paper seemed to be referencing the same Native Americans 
that Robertson claimed had discouraged the white enlistments in that area. Commenting on this, 
the editors stated that there is not “one hundred ‘armed Indians’ together in the Saginaw 
Valley… nor fifty, nor twenty-five, nor ten.…They are not there.” The paper went on to claim 
that “this is a cruel and wicked attempt of somebody to frighten the timid.”59 The only significant 
mentions of Indians in Michigan’s newspapers during 1862 emphasized Minnesota and the 
troubles it was having with the Sioux in August.60 However, it may also be possible that events 
in Minnesota created anxiety among Michiganders regarding their own native populations which 
may have encouraged men to stay home instead of enlist. Such a claim though is merely 
speculation. It seems that there was no real Native American threat in central Michigan that 
could have negatively impacted its recruitment efforts in 1862. 
The main reasons for Michigan’s failure to meet its quota seems to be a combination of 
war weariness and a self-interest to stay at home. Commonly deemed as “skimming,” Michigan 
had already committed its most fervent and willing men into Union ranks during the opening few 
months of the conflict. Those who remained, mostly farmers and business owners, as opposed to 
laborers, often felt that they had to stay at home to ensure the success of their respective 
                                                          
59 Geo F. Lewis, “Those Armed Indians in Saginaw Valley—The Whole Story Cleared-Letter from the Indian 
Agent,” East Saginaw Courier, September 16, 1862. 
60 W. H. Campbell, (Dowagiac, Michigan) Cass County Republican, December 4, 1862. This represent one example. 
I went through dozens of Michigan newspapers on the Library on Congress’s newspaper database and articles 




enterprises.61 Consequently, they did not necessarily want to entangle themselves in a war that 
increasingly became more cumbersome. Newspaper articles for example, although mentioning 
some successes at places such as Forts Henry and Donelson and at Shiloh, still wrote that “the 
rebel grand army, estimated at 200,000 in all…being much the stronger party” have placed 
“Washington…in peril.”62 Such sentiments, expressed a year after recruiting over 24,000 men, 
perhaps represents how some Michiganders felt increasingly frustrated about the war which may 
have negatively impacted their recruitment. 
The preliminary Emancipation Proclamation too, though encouraging some 
Michiganders, did not seem to translate into many recruits. As discussed earlier, Michigan, 
similar to much of the country, grew increasingly weary over the high casualties and long 
campaigning. Consequently, when Lincoln released the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, 
many Michiganders expressed a “great diversity of sentiment and policy in regard to slavery.”63 
Some supported it primarily “as a war measure, demanded by the crisis, and destined to crush out 
the rebellion” and felt pleased that it encouraged England and France to maintain their “declared 
policy of non-intervention.”64 However, others reasoned that “the emancipation scheme is the 
delusion of men” as African Americans “would prove hostile to us [white people].”65 Support for 
emancipation in Michigan seemed to stem primarily from pragmatism. Those that supported the 
President’s preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, did so out of a belief it could potentially end 
the war while simultaneously keeping foreign powers uninvolved.  
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Emancipation did not seem to motivate many Michiganders to volunteer. Although 
Democrats stated that the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation “greatly rejoiced” their 
Republican Governor who stated, “Now I have got something to work for,” Michigan was still 
“tardy in gathering and fitting out” its quota.66 Although many Michiganders generally approved 
of emancipation as a war measure, it did not seem to directly influence, either positively or 
negatively, the state’s recruitment.  
Responding to decreased volunteerism, many Michigan communities began offering 
competitive bounties as a means to entice recruitment without having to revert to a draft. 
Beginning during the summer and extending until the end of the year, Michigan newspapers 
commented on the necessity of financial bounties to meet its troop requirements. The Grand 
Haven News reported that the people of Lake Shore managed to raise two companies—the “Lake 
Shore Tigers…and the White River Tigers”— because they were “encouraging enlistments most 
patriotically and liberally” by collecting money for a bounty.67 Similarly, in December, the 
Ottawa, Michigan newspaper reported “that the quota of our town has already been furnished by 
volunteers” because its “citizens will have contributed, in all, for volunteers, some $5,000.” 
Emphasizing the importance of bounties, the article urged other “townships in our county…yet 
far behind” to promote volunteerism by advertising that “no bounty will be paid drafted men.”68 
Such was Michigan’s attempt to raise bounties that the Adjutant General stated in his 1862 report 
that “the sums of money that were contributed for the support of the families of those who 
offered themselves as volunteers, were very large.”69 Accordingly, financial bounties, coupled 
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with the “alarming sickness” and fear regarding a draft, primarily motivated Michigan’s 
recruitment efforts in 1862.70  
Wisconsin, meanwhile, although furnishing more troops than either Kentucky or 
Michigan, similarly had issues filling its quota. In 1862, the state managed to recruit a total of 
19,440 troops which increased its proportional service record to 34 percent.71 Although 
providing 3,185 fewer troops than the previous year, the state’s federal enlistments still fared 
better than either Kentucky or Michigan. However, Wisconsin still failed to meet its quota of 
23,808 men.72 Falling short by 4,368, Wisconsin, similar to Kentucky and Michigan, struggled to 
motivate their military-age population to volunteer in sufficient numbers. 
A primary reason for Wisconsin’s inability to garner enough volunteers, stems from its 
issues with raising state or local enlistment bounties. To obtain the necessary troops to avoid a 
state draft, many communities expressed the need to offer additional bounties but struggled to 
actually find people willing to contribute. In Mineral Point, for example, the newspaper stated 
that “men are willing to go if those who remain at home will contribute to the support of the 
families they leave behind.” The article then went on to argue that “we believe our State 
authorities, if they have the power, should increase the bounty offered to a more liberal amount” 
because many private citizens were “of the opinion the burden should be equally borne” as “the 
cry of high taxes frighten[ed] many.”73  
Responding to the issue of raising financial bounties, some communities started to offer 
land grants instead. The city of Grand Rapids, for example, rendered “160 acres of bounty land” 
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in addition to the compensation offered by the federal government.74 However, land bounties 
may have been complicated as many law firms in these communities advertised that they 
“attended to Soldier’s Claims for…Bounty Lands.”75 Furthermore, according to the Adjutant 
General, by 21 August 1862 the federal “bounty paid to volunteers in these new regiments will 
cease” whereas the “volunteers to fill up old regiments will receive their bounties and advance 
pay until September first.”76 Although a federal policy, this posed a significant issue in 
Wisconsin which struggled to obtain donations from private citizens for additional bounties.  
Conflicting beliefs on how to prosecute the war divided the state’s Democrats and 
Republicans which helped lead to poor recruitment returns in 1862. Throughout most of 1862, 
the partisanship which negatively influenced the state’s recruitment in 1861, seemed to have 
improved slightly. In January, for example, Democrats contended that Lincoln “kicked the 
Platform of his party overboard” by adhering to the bipartisan objective “of putting down the 
rebellion and restoring the rebel States to their allegiance to the government.” Pleased that 
Lincoln had not sought “the abolition of their [the South’s] ‘peculiar institution,’” Wisconsin’s 
Democrats may have felt more inclined to volunteer.77 Even after McClellan’s failed Peninsula 
Campaign, a Wisconsin Democrat commented that “the brave commander of the decimated 
army…urges that the new recruits should all be sent” and that a “great effort should be made in 
this direction.”78 Whether or not such overtures furnished troops, it seemed that Democrats were 
pleased that their fears of a politicized abolitionist war did not come to fruition. Perhaps 
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testifying to this, the state managed to garner nineteen volunteer regiments, of the requested 
twenty-one, prior to President Lincoln’s “radical fanaticism” of releasing his preliminary 
Emancipation Proclamation.79  
Once Lincoln announced that federal forces would free the slaves of the rebelling states 
as a military necessity, Wisconsin’s Democrats distanced themselves from the war. Between late 
September and December, they expressed an unwillingness to serve a cause which “believ[ed] 
that a nigger is at least as good, if not better than an Irishman, German, Bohemian, or 
Norwegian.”80 They stated that “we (Democrats) have offered up hundreds of thousands of 
valuable lives,” but still “the hope of the Union is every hour growing fainter” so long as the 
President “adheres to his determination to make this an abolition war.”81 Consequently, 
Democrats resisted military service. In November, riots broke out in Ozaukee County. In 
response, Governor Louis Harvey declared “every person interfering with, or resisting the draft, 
will be arrested and punished.”82 The resistance was so bad, the Governor threatened martial law 
which helped stop unruly disruptions but made Democrats feel that “a white man is now 
presumed to have no rights until the niggers are emancipated.”83 Although some Republicans 
may have participated in this resistance too, their reasons probably stemmed more from heavy 
casualties and long campaigns.84 The Republicans in the state generally contended the 
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preliminary Emancipation Proclamation was Lincoln’s “constitutional right” and that it “would 
end the struggle now, and save the Union forever.”85  
It is conceivable to conclude that Wisconsin’s failure to complete its quota stemmed from 
the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. Although they provided more troops than either 
Kentucky or Michigan, Wisconsin’s recruitment essentially stopped after September. According 
to its Adjutant General’s Report, the state raised one volunteer regiment, the 30th Wisconsin, in 
October, and conscripted the 34th Wisconsin in December.86 The state still had the manpower to 
provide the 4,368 men to balance its quota between September and December, but it seemed that 
many, namely Democrats, no longer wanted to serve. Although bloody battles, and military 
setbacks also discouraged the rage militaire exhibited by Wisconsinites in 1861, partisan politics 
hindered the state from fulfilling its quota.  
An examination of the raw recruitment data of these three states emphasizes that 
Michigan and Wisconsin far exceeded Kentucky’s furnished troops. However, after considering 
the ability of these respective states to fill their quotas, Kentucky was just as committed to the 
Union as Michigan and Wisconsin. Though Kentucky furnished fewer soldiers during 1862, its 
proportional service record of 32 percent was on par with Michigan’s 31 percent and 
Wisconsin’s 34 percent. Fraught with Confederate guerrillas, an invasion, and concerns 
regarding emancipation, Kentucky still had not forsaken its commitment to slavery or the Union.  
Kentucky’s comparable service record emphasizes that the preliminary Emancipation 
Proclamation did not devastate Kentucky unionism as scholars have argued. Although preserving 
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slavery and maintaining stability within the state was important to white Kentuckians, they did 
not seem to feel so threatened by it that they entirely disassociated themselves from the Union. 
Instead, as its recruitment data shows, Kentucky reluctantly accepted emancipation as a means to 
end the war quickly with slavery still intact.87 Although many Kentuckians, such as Simon 
Buckner and the estimated 17,000 who enlisted in Confederate forces did not support the 
measure, the rest of the state remained relatively content. Despite Confederate influences and the 
threat of emancipation, there were no mass mutinies among the troops in the field, and the state 
did not rise in rebellion. Heading into 1863, Kentuckians expressed their commitment to slavery 





                                                          





Committed to Slavery and Union in 1863 
In 1863, Kentucky enjoyed its second largest recruitment surge during the conflict. 
Although experiencing the early effects of military exhaustion from the year prior, the state 
managed to slightly outdistance its previous efforts by committing its final reserves of white 
manpower to Federal forces. Considering the state’s available, white military-age population in 
1863, and comparing its proportional service record to Michigan and Wisconsin, reveals 
Kentucky’s exceptional efforts during this time. Despite the military setbacks, high casualties, 
invasions, and guerrilla fighting which negatively affected volunteerism, Kentucky managed a 
higher service record than Michigan and Wisconsin. Such a recruitment effort, achieved without 
the inducement of financial bounties or a draft, testifies to Kentucky’s continued loyalty to the 
Union throughout 1863.  
The Emancipation Proclamation and black recruitment motivated Kentucky’s substantial 
recruitment efforts in 1863, relative to Michigan and Wisconsin. Despite the fact that 
Kentuckians detested these measures, they ironically helped cultivate unionist support. Intent on 
preserving the institution of slavery within their state and thus maintain the status quo, white 
Kentuckians resisted both of these measures by committing their final reserves of white 
manpower to the federal government in 1863. Even though Kentucky fell short of meeting its 
quota, the state’s recruitment efforts still display its dual loyalty to slavery and the Union. Unlike 
recruitment in Michigan or Wisconsin, which reverted to bounties, conscription, and the 
enlistment of its free-African American populations, Kentucky solely relied on standard federal 
bounties and volunteerism. Relying on these two measures, Kentucky furnished more troops than 




white Kentuckians sought to fill their federal quotas with white troops and negate the need of 
recruiting African Americans. 
The argument that emancipation and black recruitment motivated instead of hindered 
Kentucky’s unionist sentiment in 1863 diverges from the scholarly consensus. Premised on 
arguments of pro-slavery unionism, contemporary historians have reasoned that these measures 
undermined the state’s unionist sentiment. However, none of these arguments present an in-depth 
examination of the state’s proportional service record compared to other similarly sized Union 
states. Although white Kentuckians detested emancipation and black recruitment, their 
enlistment records prove they were still volunteering for Federal forces. Consequently, this data 
does not support the argument that these two measures caused broader Kentucky unionism to 
decline. Instead, Kentucky’s white enlistments emphasize a reinvigorated population, intent on 
preserving white supremacy through federal military service. Essentially, this chapter argues that 
emancipation and black recruitment ensured the state’s continued loyalty as displayed by its 
military support of the Union.  
In the first couple months of 1863, Kentuckians condemned the Emancipation 
Proclamation and black recruitment but reaffirmed their commitment to the Union. On the first 
of January, the Louisville Daily Journal articulated that armies should not get “distracted by 
emancipation,” but should focus on “crushing out the rebellion, and the restoration of the 
supremacy of the laws.”1 These editors reasoned once they restored the Union, the “genius of our 
American institutions will survive the shock it has received, and we will soon be able to hail the 
advent of peace…in bonds of fraternity by the necessities of mutual dependence.”2 This article 
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denotes how emancipation and black recruitment threatened slavery, while concurrently 
reassuring readers the laws of the Union would still protect the institution in loyal states. 
Similarly, the Louisville Daily Democrat stated how the Emancipation Proclamation was an 
“invitation to servile insurrection.” However, they also noted “this Administration is not the 
Government” and their “loyalty to the Constitution, the Union and the Flag, does not imply an 
approval or support of the follies of our temporary rulers.”3 Even Lieutenant Governor R. T. 
Jacob, in a speech to the Kentucky Senate in December, reasoned Kentucky must “appeal to the 
people of the loyal States to bring back the policy of the war to what we conceive a constitutional 
basis.”4 Consequently, despite their abhorrence of abolitionists and the Lincoln Administration, 
white Kentuckians generally still favored the established laws of the Constitution. 
In 1863, Kentuckians increasingly elicited the support of the Constitution to question the 
legality of emancipation and black recruitment. During this year, the state’s politicians and 
newspapers endeavored to conceal their commitment to slavery behind appeals for state 
sovereignty. Alluding to this, Kentucky’s newly elected governor, Thomas Bramlette, stated in 
his inaugural address, “the Federal Constitution, which created the Union, harmonized the equal 
security of all in every right, with the unity of the government, and with the rights of the States.”5 
Essentially, Bramlette’s message illustrated that the Constitution preserved and protected the 
diverse interests of the respective states. Bramlette also reasoned the “dominant powers” must 
not force “immediate or gradual emancipation” and instead should work to reunite the country 
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under “its Constitution, as it was before.”6 Concurrently, the Louisville Daily Democrat iterated 
how “it was an appreciation of the Union as it was that influenced Kentucky” and that “the 
Democrats protected...slavery because it is sheltered under the ample shield of the 
Constitution.”7 The Lexington Observer and Reporter noted the recent “forfeitures, 
confiscations, emancipation of slaves, [and] the raising of negro armies… [as being] 
unconstitutional.”8 Many white Kentuckians viewed emancipation as a temporary policy, not a 
forerunner to more abolition, and believed Conservatives could overturn it. Kentuckian’s desire 
to conclude the war and maintain the Constitution as it was, emphasizes their conservative 
unionism and commitment to preserve and perpetuate the institution of slavery. 
Intending to preserve slavery, Kentuckians argued the Federal Government should rely 
solely on white recruits to win the war. In February, the Dollar Weekly Bulletin republished an 
article from the Cincinnati Enquirer about how sanctioning black recruitment made some “white 
regiments at Ship Island (Mississippi) ready to mutiny.” The article concluded by stating how “a 
few negro regiments would disorganize and destroy the whole army.”9 Emphasizing the belief 
that it was a white man’s war, the Dollar Weekly Bulletin effectively condemned black 
recruitment as a detriment to the integrity of Federal forces already in the field. In reference to 
those troops, the Louisville Daily Journal published a letter they received from some Kentucky 
soldiers which condemned the president but reaffirmed their loyalty. The soldiers stated that 
although “the President [was not] a very great man…. he nor all the bad men in the world can 
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drive these old Kentucky soldiers from their loyalty to their Constitutional Government.”10 
White Kentuckians subsequently seemed resolved to persevere through the controversy of 
abolition by remaining loyal to the federal government. 
White Kentuckians affirmed their commitment to the Union in 1863 by committing their 
final reserves of manpower to the Union cause. During this year, Kentucky furnished its second 
highest number of troops by enlisting 13,743 men which bolstered the state’s federal contribution 
to 59,216, and its Union service record to 42 percent.11 Despite the taxing effects of Confederate 
recruitment, which placed the state’s total service record at 65 percent, Kentucky still managed 
to effectively enlist Federal troops.12 Although the Border State still fell short of its quota of 
14,471, they fared better than Michigan and Wisconsin. Considering the negative connotations 
associated with emancipation and black recruitment, Kentucky’s 1863 recruitment, compared to 
Michigan and Wisconsin, is significant as it emphasizes the state’s continued loyalty. In 
determining what motivated Kentuckians to achieve this Federal service record, it is important to 
understand the state’s association between white Union recruitment and the preservation of 
slavery within the state.  
The federal policy of black recruitment intended to both hinder the Confederate war 
effort and reinforce the ability of Union armies to wage war. Black recruitment officially began 
in July of 1862 with the Militia Act. The Federal Government legitimized the army’s use of 
Confederate “contraband,” by emancipating and employing former slaves as laborers, hospital 
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workers, or armed guards. However, alluding to fears that the measure would upset the loyal 
Border States, Lincoln exempted free northern blacks and the slaves of loyal masters from 
service and denied African Americans active combat roles.13 Lincoln hoped that limiting 
abolition to the pragmatic demands of the war would both destabilize the institution in the 
rebelling states, and allow the Union to utilize this “great available and yet unavailed of, force.”14  
The perpetual demand for troops motived the federal government to increase enlistment 
bounties and allow states to fill their quotas with black troops. Introduced by the Enrollment Act, 
all states had to register available military-aged males for a draft in the event the state failed to 
meet its respective quota with volunteers.15 States and towns hoped to foster recruitment and 
avoid conscription by offering competitive bounties that often ranged upwards from $300.16 
However, if these incentives failed to encourage enough white volunteers, the Enrollment Act 
also permitted states to fill their quotas by recruiting African Americans. Despite protests by 
Peace Democrats, and the fact that the North did not contain large, free-black populations, many 
states, including Michigan and Wisconsin, acquiesced and enrolled their African Americans as 
eligible recruits.17 Even in the occupied South, specifically Louisiana and the South Carolina 
coast, the Union recruited or conscripted thousands of former slaves to augment their forces.18 
Effectively, the desperate need for fresh troops incentivized not only a national draft complete 
with a competitive bounty system, but black recruitment. 
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 Kentuckians argued against recruiting African Americans stating that it would only 
diminish and subvert their unionist resolve. Unlike emancipation, which one could interpret as 
intended to solely undermine the Confederacy, black recruitment could directly affect all loyal 
states by allowing them to fill quotas with black troops. Because of the Enrollment and 
Conscription Acts, federal armies had the authority to directly reinforce their commands by 
incorporating African Americans. Such a prospect though, weighed heavily upon the loyal 
Border States who depended on slavery as a mainstay of their economic and societal character. 
In a speech to Congress, Kentucky Representative John Crittenden stated, “it never can be 
expedient in this country to raise an army of negroes so long as we remain of the proud free 
race.” Crittenden went on to argue that the measure “unnerves the white man’s hand… [and] 
unnerves the white man’s heart…. [and] goes against the deep-rooted prejudices of at least one 
half of our people.” Considering the national recruitment shortages, Crittenden stated if the 
Union “retrace[ed] our steps, and ma[de] this again a national war….you will have volunteers 
enough.”19 Crittenden’s focus on black recruitment signifies that many Kentuckians viewed the 
measure as a direct threat to the interests of the state. Although Crittenden’s efforts failed, his 
speech personifies Kentucky’s resentment towards abolition and Kentuckians’ willingness to 
volunteer in favor of the Constitution as it was. 
Concerns regarding the effects of emancipation and black recruitment on slavery often 
tainted Kentuckian’s perception of significant federal victories in 1863. Examining the principle 
victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, many Kentuckians concentrated on the high casualties 
and often criticized the Union’s association with abolition. Referencing Gettysburg, the Dollar 
Weekly Bulletin lamented how the “forty thousand two hundred able-bodied white men of the 
                                                          




United States mutilated and killed…. [were] verily a sacrifice to the utopian idea of Negro 
Equality.”20 Similarly, after the fighting at Vicksburg, the Lexington Observer and Reporter 
highlighted that “about five thousand negroes were found in Vicksburg, of whom all the able 
bodied men were recruited for military service.”21 Despite the fact that these were major federal 
victories, white Kentuckians primarily emphasized the casualties and considered the impact it 
would have on their institution. Kentucky papers still noted how these were “brilliant” victories 
but after emancipation and black recruitment became effective, the war took on a different 
meaning as federal victories no longer represented a return to the Union as it had been.22 
Although fighting for the Union and furnishing white recruits helped preserve slavery in 
Kentucky, the state was nonetheless witnessing, and indirectly participating in, the destruction of 
slavery in the Deep South. Conceivably, this concerned many Kentuckians as it destroyed the 
slave markets which had previously been so profitable. Federal victories, although still 
representing good news, made many Kentuckians anxious about the future of slavery. 
 The introduction of emancipation, black recruitment, and the draft, may have created a 
surge in Kentucky’s Confederate recruiting as well. Owing to Kentucky’s commitment to 
slavery, it is conceivable to reason that the majority of those Southern sympathizers still dwelling 
within the state, would have responded to these measures by enlisting in Confederate armies.23 
However, determining the exact number of Confederate recruits is difficult owing to a lack of 
documentary evidence. Some Kentuckians felt betrayed. A Holmes County farmer expressed that 
“the gallant Puritans of Massachusetts,” who have “learned to appreciate abolition,” do so in a 
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manner “that involves no danger to [their] person.”24 The Louisville Daily Democrat similarly 
referenced the “military necessity” of emancipation, black recruitment, and the draft by arguing 
that “if a Government must do such things to save its life, that Government ought to die. Its time 
has come.”25 Arguably, the apprehension and suspicion many Kentuckians had of the Union after 
emancipation, black recruitment, and the fact the federal government could draft them, may have 
encouraged many to join Confederate forces.26 There was a noticeable increase of Confederate 
guerrilla action in Kentucky during 1863 which may attest to this surge of rebel recruits.27 
Although speculative, it is conceivable that the bulk of Kentucky’s estimated 32,500 ardent 
Southern-sympathizers, would have been in Confederate service by the end of 1863. 
However, Union victories in 1863 may also have positively influenced Kentucky’s 
recruitment. Because the Union began the year after the defeat at Fredericksburg, which 
newspapers ominously reported caused “about one-third more [casualties] than in any other 
battle of the war,” it is conceivable the victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg helped stimulate 
enthusiasm.28 Kentucky’s newspapers articulated how the South’s “greatest general, Lee, has 
been defeated, Vicksburg and Port Hudson taken—Bragg is still flying for life’s sake before 
Rosecrans, whilst the desperate raiders under Morgan have been beaten and scattered.”29 These 
victories made many feel “Jeff. Davis’ government is evidently crumbling and cannot last much 
longer.”30 Similarly, the Louisville Daily Democrat noted “the defeat of the enemy at 
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Gettysburg; his compulsory evacuation of Pennsylvania and Maryland, and his withdraw from 
the upper valley of the Shenandoah [is] regard[ed] as a complete success.”31  These victories 
might have encouraged some white Kentuckians to enlist. 
The primary incentive for white Kentuckian enlistment in 1863, was their intent to 
protect state sovereignty and slavery. To achieve this objective, white Kentuckians sought to 
provide enough white recruits to avoid the necessity of black recruitment, preserving the 
integrity of slavery within their state. Determined to promote white racial hierarchy, Kentucky’s 
newspapers criticized and questioned the ability of black soldiers. In one example, while 
discussing the “‘1st South Carolina Volunteers,’ or ‘Greeley’s Own,’” the Weekly Reporter in 
Henderson stated “the whole regiment disgraced themselves at St. Mary’s Fla …by skedaddling 
from a handful of rebels.” The editor concluded, “they (black soldiers) are not fit neither can they 
be made fit—to carry a musket in the face of an enemy.”32 The Louisville Daily Democrat 
similarly condemned the enterprise in a hypothetical conversation with a member of the 9th 
Illinois Colored Infantry, which had recently fared poorly in combat. The author of this colloquy 
commented, “if our soldiers were like you, traitors might have broken up the government without 
resistance.”33 Both of these articles imply black soldiers were inadequate cowards and arming 
them was both detrimental and pointless to the Union cause. Condemning black recruitment, 
Kentuckians emphasized their preference for white volunteers as a means to prevent African 
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American incorporation into the war.34 Kentuckians were, in effect, lobbying against black 
recruitment by emphasizing the superiority of white soldiers.35 
Responding to Kentucky’s protests, the federal government suspended the enrollment of 
African Americans in the Border State despite the fact that the state fell short of its troop quota. 
Kentucky’s objections to black recruitment, spearheaded by Governor Bramlette, urgently 
stressed to President Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton how black recruitment in 
Kentucky would be detrimental to unionist sentiment.36 Despite the Union’s need for troops, on 
22 July 1863, Lincoln authorized Stanton to obtain the necessary “colored forces, along the 
shores of the Missippi (sic)” instead of enrolling Kentucky’s black population.37 Rumors 
continued to circulate within Kentucky which accused federal recruiting agents of attempting to 
complete Kentucky’s quota by enlisting its black population. In response, Governor Bramlette 
again expressed to Lincoln how black recruitment would have “dire effects…upon the interest of 
my people” and urged that “all action [be] suspended as to Ky (sic), until I can be heard.”38 
Kentucky’s fervent recruitment of white soldiers, coupled with the potentially explosive backlash 
of enlisting black Kentuckians, caused the federal government to temporarily suspend black 
recruitment in the state during 1863.39   
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Whereas Kentucky committed its final reserves of white manpower to prevent black 
recruitment in 1863, Michigan and Wisconsin struggled to find volunteers to fill their ranks. 
Michigan and Wisconsin, both being Republican majority states, still confronted issues of 
political partisanship, conscription, commutation (which allowed drafted men to purchase a 
military deferment), and war weariness, resulting in fewer enlistments. Relying heavily on 
bounties —federal, state, and local— as well as the draft, Michigan and Wisconsin fell 
drastically short of meeting their respective quotas. To explain why Kentucky’s recruitment 
excelled while Michigan and Wisconsin’s enlistments diminished, it is necessary to examine 
both states’ respective service records. 
  
This graph shows Kentucky’s white recruitment from 1861 to 1863.The slight rise in Kentucky’s 1863 
recruiting implies the emancipation and black recruitment did not significantly harm the state’s military efforts.40 
 
Michigan’s recruitment in 1863, emphasizes how enthusiasm to enlist was lower than in 
Kentucky. At first glance, it may appear that the state’s 13,567 recruits for the year, bringing its 
proportional service record to 43 percent, did not conspicuously differ from Kentucky’s 
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13,743.41 However, Michigan had a quota of 19,553, meaning it lacked 5,986 troops.42 
Compounding Michigan’s shortcoming, 3,093 of these men were draftees.43 These numbers 
emphasize how volunteerism in Michigan had diminished compared to Kentucky.  
Michigan attempted to prevent conscription by fostering a competitive bounty system to 
incentivize volunteers. Bounties, present in Kentucky newspapers as well, appeared more 
prevalently in both Michigan newspapers and its Adjutant General’s Report. 44 In addition to the 
federal and state bounties, Michigan’s counties and towns heavily advertised competitive 
financial bonuses to reinvigorate enlistments. The Cass County Republican reported how a new 
“township bounty, in addition to the county bounty” would “dra[w] ten per cent interest... paid 
annually” which was “in addition to the government bounty” of $200.45 Ottawa County claimed 
bounties had “a happy influence on recruiting” as “every portion of our county is alive to the 
work of recruiting.”46 East Saginaw appointed five men to head a “‘Central Bounty Committee,’ 
whose duty” it was “to offer a bounty of not more than one hundred dollars to each man 
enlisting.”47 Similarly, Michigan’s Adjutant General claimed that towns and communities hoping 
to meet “this (troop) demand without the necessity of a draft” must offer “local bounties of 
liberal amount.”48 Bounties in Michigan were so important, individual units, such as Captain 
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Meigs’s Sharp Shooters, offered a $42 bounty “aside from all local bounties” to further 
encourage enlistments.49 Among Michiganders, a strong desire prevailed to use “liberality and 
patriotism” in order “to get in out of the draft and preserve our good name and influence among 
our patriotic sister states.”50 These articles signify how integral competitive bounties were to 
Michigan’s recruitment efforts in 1863.  
Michigan’s competitive bounty system had negative side-effects as it fostered bounty 
jumping and desertion. For example, the East Saginaw Courier reported “cupidity instead of 
patriotism” motivated recruits and “in consequence some have enlisted merely to obtain the 
bounties, and have then deserted disgracefully.”51 However, the newspaper claimed this “evil has 
grown not out of the fact that a bounty is offered, but out of the want of uniformity in amount.”52 
In Cass County, bounty jumping encouraged local officials to stipulate how “the bounty of $100 
is payable to discharged soldiers only… by reason of wounds received in battle, or… [after 
serving] a period of two years—or during the war if sooner ended.”53 Grand Haven similarly had 
issues with bounty jumpers. The newspaper stated “in three days, 60 out of 210 substitutes in one 
regiment had deserted”54 Although towns may have signed enough men to fill their quota on 
paper, they were incapable of delivering “their men at the Headquarters… [to be] enlisted” 
leaving their actual troop requirement unfulfilled.55  
Competitive bounties and commutation promoted class distinctions negatively affecting 
volunteerism. Although these measures differ slightly, as bounties came from the community and 
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commutation from a drafted individual, they both filled quotas by incentivizing others to go in 
the stead of wealthier, more established men. Community leaders, primarily local business 
owners or farmers, sought to raise the necessary funds to entice “drifters” to substitute 
themselves in the place of the more affluent and productive.56 Grand Haven hoped to “induce 
volunteers, as much as possible, with the non-producing classes” by offering “liberal bounties.”57 
Wealthy individuals could essentially purchase their way out of service. As a result, many 
Michiganders felt bounties and commutation were “discriminating oppressively against those 
who are without property and means to furnish the commutation money.”58 Discontented 
Michiganders expressed how competitive bounties and commutation often benefitted “a separate 
locality, leaving other localities unaided.”59 The East Saginaw Courier commented how “thieves 
and shysters... who prey upon the patriotism of others to shield themselves from their legitimate 
burdens” work “most unfavorably against the efforts” to meet the quota.60 The argument against 
local bounties and commutation stemmed from disproportionate service as wealthier counties 
could essentially buy their way out of service by enticing potential recruits to their locales which 
conceivably hindered enlistments in poorer regions.61 Consequently, Michigan communities who 
did manage to fill their quotas, did so by draining other counties’ manpower preventing them 
from meeting their own quotas. 
 Further testifying to the desperate nature of Michigan recruitment, the state enrolled its 
relatively small, free-black population. Unlike Kentucky, Michigan capitalized on black 
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recruitment in July as soon as Secretary of War Edwin Stanton approved Detroit’s application to 
raise “a Regiment of colored Infantry.”62 Advertisements “for the first regiment of colored 
infantry, now going into camp at Detroit” began to appear in Michigan newspapers. Proclaiming 
an “excellent opportunity for colored men,” the Cass County Republican emphasized how black 
soldiers “receive[ed] the same bounty and pay as white recruits, and at the same time escape[d] 
the draft.”63 Some Democrats detested black recruitment, claiming there were “but few 
comparatively who can be induced to join our armies [as] the negroes will not voluntarily 
enlist.”64 Despite the protests, Michigan went ahead and implemented black recruitment. African 
American recruits counted as full credits, and since Michiganders struggled to find enough white 
volunteers, they implemented black recruitment, enlisting 489 men, despite Democratic 
protests.65 
Patriotism did not seem to rally much support in Michigan as many placed conditions on 
their service. In February, the Democratic newspaper, East Saginaw Courier stated “there is no 
man so little a patriot as will not yield to it his whole support and countenance,” but only “if the 
Administration changes its base.” Referencing the “obnoxious” abolitionists, it seems the 
Emancipation Proclamation discouraged some Michiganders from volunteering.66 Similarly, the 
Grand Haven News, another Democratic newspaper, reported after emancipation there was more 
inclination to serve a Union cause which valued Democratic Party principles. Alluding to 
abolition, the editors argued “that true conservatism and genuine patriotism will overcome the 
fanatical spirit” and encourage “every lover of his country [to] stand by the good old democratic 
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party.”67 It is evident from these examples, some Michigan Democrats did not want to serve a 
war radicalized by Republicans. 
Republicans expressed conditional patriotism by claiming Lincoln’s Emancipation 
Proclamation encouraged them to serve. Even though “the Proclamation of Emancipation was 
long delayed…[it] will stand as one of the monuments of American greatness” for which 
Republicans “thank[ed] God, by the sword it (slavery) is to fall.”68 The Cass County Republican 
iterated “it gladden[ed] the heart of every loyal man to know that...no slave freed under its 
provisions will be reduced again to servitude.”69 By 1863, the Emancipation Proclamation 
politicized the war to the extent that formally moderate Democrats and Republicans utilized their 
respective political beliefs to either resist or support the war effort.  
Michigan’s political partisanship affected how both parties portrayed and perceived 
battles. Republicans noted how federal victories had taken “away the prestage (sic) of 
invincibility from Lee…relieved the loyal States from the presence of an enemy on their soil…. 
[and] broke up utterly and forever one of the grand armies of the rebellion.”70 Democrats, 
meanwhile, after determining Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address to be “an endorsement of all the ill-
judged measures of the abolition programe (sic),” argued the military situation was not as good 
as the Administration proclaimed. Democrats noted how Lee’s army still existed while “Meade’s 
army was so weakened” it could not stop Lee from “destroy[ing] miles of railroad indispensable 
to our forces.”71 Despite the victory at Gettysburg, Michigan Democrats remained upset about 
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the January Emancipation Proclamation and their perception that Lincoln influenced the war to 
favor Republican objectives. 
Even in September, after the Union defeat at Chickamauga, divergent political 
allegiances created two narratives of the same battle. The Cass County Republican argued that 
while the number of “wounded are heavy,” the number actually killed was “extremely light.”72 
Essentially, Republican papers emphasized positive information over negative to support Lincoln 
and his prosecution of the war. This might explain why in early December 1863, Republican 
papers allowed the “very brilliant” victory of Chattanooga to overshadow the previous defeat at 
Chickamauga. Republicans underlined how federal troops regained “the old battle field of 
Chickamauga” and set to work “burying our dead…left uncovered since September 20th.”73 
Meanwhile, Democrats focused on the high casualties at Chickamauga by stating “such 
figures…tell a terrific story of suffering and bloodshed.” The East Saginaw Courier continued 
by expressing hope the defeat would “lead to deep and solemn thought on the methods of 
bringing it (the war) to a close.”74 Even after the success at Chattanooga, Democrats articulated 
how victories were fragile by comparing them to “bubbles, born with a breath and broken with a 
sigh.”75 The divergent portrayal of the war may have affected the state’s recruitment in 1863, but 
it is hard to determine the extent to which it influenced men of both parties to volunteer. The 
positive and encouraging articles may have excited like-minded individuals to volunteer, while 
the negative articles might have dissuaded others from enlisting.76  
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 Michigan communities had to rely on a draft as they failed to obtain sufficient volunteers. 
Commenting on the “few enlistments…taking place,” some Michiganders felt content “to take 
their chance of drawing a prize in the draft-lottery than to enlist.”77 By the late fall of 1863, 
Michiganders were so reluctant to serve that only conscription could garner their services. 
Hillsdale, Michigan exemplifies the state’s declining desire to enlist in 1863. In January, the 
county newspaper stated how “enlistments must be hurried up… [so] the quota of Hillsdale 
County be filled and save a draft.” Despite the sense of urgency, Hillsdale continually struggled 
to obtain the necessary recruits. By October, responding to requests from community leaders, the 
War Department granted “Hillsdale County… a few more days to fill its quota” during which 
time, the newspaper claimed, “Hillsdale can if the proper efforts are put forth.” However, by 
November, the county still had not raised sufficient volunteers and “Hillsdale [would] be the first 
in the [draft] wheel.”78 Although Michigan managed to raise 10,474 volunteers through bounties, 
commutation, black recruitment, and a draft, it still failed its quota despite having a large 
manpower reserve from which to draw.79 
Wisconsin also struggled to obtain recruits in 1863, falling significantly under its quota. 
According to the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, the federal government assigned 
Wisconsin the job of enlisting 19,852 troops.80 Of this quota, the state only managed to procure 
8,904 men, bringing its proportional service record to 42 percent.81 Of these recruits, 5,961 were 
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conscripts which meant only 2,943 men actually volunteered.82 Considering this data, and 
comparing it against Kentucky and Michigan, it is clear Wisconsin had serious problems 
obtaining willing recruits in 1863.  
Wisconsin’s recruitment service in 1863 was so complex and rife with issues, it 
undermined the potentially positive effect of bounties. In a letter to Edwin Stanton, Wisconsin’s 
Assistant Adjutant General T. M. Vincent addressed “the manner in which the recruiting service 
has been heretofore conducted in this state.” He explained how the state had authorized second 
lieutenants to recruit in exchange for “a commission.” However, these officers often relegated 
the duties of actually enlisting the troops to local citizens who, through personal “influence in 
their respective localities, enlisted the soldiers.” A problem arose when it came time to muster in 
recruits as these citizen agents had not themselves received the Provost Marshal General’s 
permission to sign recruits or promise bounties. Consequently, many of those men who signed 
with these unauthorized civilian agents struggled to obtain their state and federal bounties and 
may have refused to muster.83 Wisconsin recruiting apparatus was so injurious that Gaylord 
asked the War Department at the end of the year, when the poor recruitment returns became 
evident, how “recruiting should be carried on in the future.” In response, the War Department 
recommended Wisconsin “not to exceed three recruiting agents for each new company” to 
reduce the number of unauthorized recruiters.84  
Wisconsin’s convoluted recruiting service may not have been its only hindrance as anger 
relating to class discrimination may equally have disrupted volunteerism. The Enrollment Act of 
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1863 permitted a drafted man to pay $300 to have an exempt substitute go in his stead. Many 
Northerners, especially the large German and Irish populations in Wisconsin, became 
discontented as they were unable to buy their way out of service.85 Furthermore, the state’s 
competitive bounty system hindered enlistment in some of Wisconsin’s towns. In Mineral Point, 
townspeople lamented they could not get “a bounty sufficient to induce enlistment” as enlistees 
travelled to wealthier cities, such as Madison, in pursuit of more substantial compensation. The 
Mineral Point Weekly Tribune commented, “every man who goes to another place to enlist, 
betters the chance of those left for securing a prize when the draft comes.”86 Fights and protests 
soon broke out in many of these smaller towns, German and Irish Peace Democrats resisted the 
draft because they did not have the financial means to commute themselves or raise a bounty.87 
Effectively, many Wisconsinites did not want to serve, viewing these measures as favoring the 
wealthy. 
Political division also appeared to be a major problem for Wisconsin’s recruiting. 
Democrats expressed growing discontent about serving in a war headed by a Republican 
Administration. Owing to partisanship, many Republicans felt Democrats were not serving as 
they “would be glad to see all who differ from them in politics go to the war.”88 Greatly upset 
over the Emancipation Proclamation, many Democrats sensed they should “beware” of being 
“led by the pleadings, passions, theories and partisan interests of men in power.”89 Republicans 
often argued that “the opposition to volunteering, among a certain class of would-be political 
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leaders is so strong.... but few will come forward even if the bounty is raised.”90 When it came 
time to enroll, recruiting officers often had difficulty finding eligible men. Many, perhaps unable 
to pay commutation or fearful their community could not offer a sufficient bounty to avoid a 
draft, sought medical exemptions. Traveling to Fond Du Loc, Wisconsin, or “Coward’s 
Headquarters” as Republicans called it, these men sought-out the Democratic-sympathizing 
examining board known for deeming fit men ineligible for military service.91 Wisconsin’s 
political partisanship may have resulted in its significantly fewer troops for 1863.92 
Wisconsin’s recruiters were desperate for troops and many turned to underage boys to 
help meet the state’s quota. Often enthralled with notions of patriotism and battlefield 
excitement, underage soldiers were not solely unique to Wisconsin.93 In response to the 
desperate nature of the state’s recruiting service in 1863, underage recruiting seemed more 
prevalent in Wisconsin than either Kentucky or Michigan. As early as May of 1862, the state’s 
Adjutant General reported, “the Department is daily importuned for the discharge of recruits 
claimed to be under age” and issued orders that it was “the duty of the officer to judge for 
himself” if a recruit was of military age.94 However, underage recruitment seemed to persist as 
on 20 October 1863, Gaylord, with the permission of the Governor, issued General Order 19. 
Meant to halt officers from filling their commands through “the enlistment of minors under 
eighteen years of age, without the consent of the parents,” the Order called for “revocation of the 
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appointment, and consequent loss of commission.”95 Neither Kentucky nor Michigan had to 
issue explicit orders to their recruiters not to enlist minors.96 That is not to say enlisting underage 
boys did not occur in those states, but the fact Wisconsin’s Adjutant General issued two orders to 
counter underage enlistment signifies its prominence to the state’s recruitment. 
 Another measure Wisconsin enacted to help bolster its quota was black recruitment. 
Similar to Michigan, Wisconsin began recruiting as soon as the War Department approved the 
state’s appeal to raise black troops.97 Compared to Kentucky and Michigan, Wisconsin had the 
smallest, military-aged free black population with only 329 men.98 Considering “the sparseness 
of [the] colored population in this State, there was little encouragement to any white officers to 
undertake the raising of even a company.”99 Although Wisconsin was unable to organize any 
black regiments in 1863, African Americans did not remain idle as the War Department credited 
the state for 182 black men who volunteered in neighboring states’ regiments.100   
Wisconsin’s acceptance of black recruitment did not seem to overly affect its white 
enlistments. Political partisanship appeared to be the primary inhibitor to the state’s recruitment. 
After the Emancipation Proclamation, many of Wisconsin’s Democrats expressed disinterest in 
volunteering for an abolitionist war. Not too surprisingly, this animosity towards black 
emancipation affected many Democrats’ opinion of black soldiers. Democrats commented how 
African American troops were “wholly inefficient…for lack of discipline,” and stated how their 
camps were in “bad condition” and “where the negroes assemble in camp, pestilence marks them 
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for her own.”101 However, these articles also emphasized how the perceived shortcomings of 
black troops were because “they are neglected at Washington” and their sufferings the result of 
receiving “little more attention or sympathy.”102 Instead of displaying anger at having black men 
serve in their stead, Democratic criticism focused more on the inefficacies and perceived bad 
policies of the Republican Administration. 
It is difficult to prove black recruitment in particular negatively affected Democratic 
volunteerism. Concern regarding Republican mismanagement of African American enlisting 
seemed the root of Democratic criticisms of black soldiers. Rufus Dawes’s memoir helps support 
this notion as he commented in late 1862 and early 1863, how he and many of his Democratic 
comrades were in favor of utilizing blacks to help win the war.103 Some Democrats may have 
seen potential for black recruits if the War Department became more efficient at organizing and 
caring for these new soldiers. Many of Wisconsin’s Democrats were expressly against 
emancipation, but when it came to fill their troop quota, they did not all appear hostile to 
enlisting black troops.  
Democratic dissent regarding emancipation also helped spur the peace movement in 
Wisconsin which undermined the state’s recruitment efforts. Upset over the Emancipation 
Proclamation and the draft, the Peace Democrats, known as Copperheads, also protested “the 
policy of arbitrary arrests, the enlistment of negro soldiers, and any other measure of the 
administration.”104 German and Irish immigrants generally detested the Republican 
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Administration’s power to conscript them into a bloody war to free the slaves. Between 
September of 1862 and early July of 1863, Wisconsin experienced “the high tide of the 
Copperheads.”105 In May of 1863, Rufus Dawes commented on how many of his comrades’ 
enlistment terms were expiring and their regimental recruiters in Wisconsin could not find 
enough replacements. Dawes reasoned the primary explanation for their inability to obtain the 
necessary recruits was because of the “cowards back home” who were “for peace at any 
price.”106 Although the victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg diminished Copperhead activity in 
Wisconsin, their objections to Republican rule and emancipation survived and affected the 
broader Democratic Party platform.107 It is reasonable to consider Wisconsin’s peace movement 
as a plausible explanation for why recruitment slackened.  
Regarding Wisconsin’s Republicans, emancipation and black recruitment did not 
significantly affect their enlistment. Although they still supported the President on the grounds 
that both measures were necessary war aims, it did not spur them to enlist in significant numbers. 
Republicans argued in the Mineral Point Weekly Tribune how “it is universally conceded that the 
negroes make capital soldiers… they have fought as well as any soldiers in the U. S. Army.” 108 
The Dodgeville Chronicle concurred with Lincoln’s assertion that “successes could not have 
been achieved where it was, but for the aid of black soldiers” who through their service, left “so 
much less for whites to do in saving the Union.”109 The pragmatism of admitting black soldiers 
especially pleased Wisconsin’s Republicans as they stated, “God speed the enterprise, and thus 
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save the lives of white men.”110 Expressing reservations regarding the “rebel barbarity” of not 
granting black troops “treatment recognized by civilized nations,” Republicans still endeavored 
to recruit and deploy African American soldiers.111 However, the belief African American 
soldiers could and should fight did not translate into white Republican recruits. Whether or not 
they believed black soldiers could take their place is uncertain, but turning to black soldiers did 
not correlate with an increase in white enlistment. 
Many Republican Wisconsinites may have favored the military’s use of African 
Americans as a means to preserve white lives. Rufus Dawes, though an abolitionist prior to the 
war, noted the pragmatic value of utilizing former slaves. While in Virginia, Dawes described 
ordering a “colored man who came into [their] picket line” with information on enemy positions, 
to personally guide the unit so “that if he led them into an ambush, he would certainly be the first 
one killed.”112 The Republican Mineral Point Weekly Tribune similarly contended “the 
necessities of this country demand than (sic) men be drafted, are black men so sacred that they 
shall not be made to bear their share? Are niggers better than white men?”113 In November, a 
month after the War Department approved Wisconsin’s plans to organize black troops, 
Republican Wisconsinites favored the plan as “our army would now have at least 800,000 negro 
soldiers, and no more white men would be required to take the field.” 114 The perceived 
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pragmatism of “Sambo’s right to be kilt,” expressed by these examples, emphasize that many 
Republican Wisconsinites favored black recruitment as it saved white men.115  
Throughout 1863, Wisconsin recruiters urged men to volunteer so they could avoid the 
perceived shame of being a draftee. In Manitowoc, recruiting officers claimed, “volunteering is 
far better than being drafted and we hope many of our young men will avail themselves of the 
opportunity.”116 Hoping to portray a benefit of volunteering, the article described how recruits 
could pick their branch of service whereas conscripts had no such option.117 Recruiters made 
these overtures to convince men to enlist suggesting intense draft anxiety. In Dodgeville, a 
recruiter attempted to conjure optimism claiming he had “no doubt he w[ould] raise a company 
within a short period.”118 Alluding to Wisconsin’s First Heavy Artillery, the unit this recruiter 
was attempting to organize, the Adjutant General later reported “for some unexplained cause, but 
slow progress has been made.”119 Although Wisconsin recruiters attempted to portray optimism, 
recruitment data shows the state struggled to furnish volunteers resulting in conscription. 
Studying Michigan and Wisconsin recruitment is important as it emphasizes Kentucky’s 
exertion to obtain white volunteers to meet its troop quota. Problems hindering Michigan and 
Wisconsin, including political partisanship, class distinction, and war weariness, were present in 
Kentucky but did not significantly obstruct its recruitment. Furthermore, neither Michigan nor 
Wisconsin suffered the internal divisions which encouraged armed conflict among Kentuckians. 
                                                          
115 S. Lover and Miles O' Riley, “Sambos Right to Be Kilt,” (New York: Wm. Hall & Son, 1864). “Sambo’s Right to 
be Kilt” was a popular Union poem in 1864 which expressed the military pragmatism of black recruitment. 
116  J. Crowley, Manitowoc Pilot, December 4, 1863.   
117  J. Crowley, Manitowoc Pilot, December 4, 1863. 
118 R. Crosby, “Recruiting for the First Heavy Artillery,” Dodgeville Chronicle, June 25 1863.  




Kentucky exerted itself to furnish an adequate number of white troops to make black recruitment 
unnecessary within the state. 
Emancipation and black recruitment did not cause Kentucky’s loyalty to the Union to 
diminish in 1863. Despite the fact that these measures posed a direct threat to slavery, white 
Kentuckians generally kept faith with the Federal Government as evident by their recruitment 
data. Kentuckians did not draft or rely heavily on local bounties to entice volunteers which 
emphasizes their willingness to serve. Kentucky managed to fill 94 percent of its quota with 
volunteers while Michigan and Wisconsin, relying on conscription, bounties, and black 
recruitment, procured 69 percent and 44 percent of their respective quotas.120 However, if white 
Kentuckians were enlisting to prevent black recruitment, the fact they failed to meet their quota, 
leaving the possibility for black conscription, seems to deviate from the argument. 
The reason Kentucky failed to meet its 1863 quota was because the state had exhausted 
its white military-aged population and could not continue to meet federal troop demands. 
Although at first Kentucky’s 42 percent Union service record, compares to Michigan’s 43 
percent and Wisconsin’s 42 percent, the figure does not account for the manpower lost to the 
Confederacy. Estimating that 32,500 Kentuckians enlisted in rebel forces by the end of 1863, 
Kentucky’s total service record was 65 percent.121 This number is significant as it emphasizes 
how the state was committing some of its final reserves of white manpower in 1863. Over half of 
Kentucky’s eligible population was serving and thus exempt from further service. Michigan and 
Wisconsin, meanwhile, did not have to contend with such significant loss to their available 
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manpower. The fact Kentucky had a comparable service record to Michigan and Wisconsin, 
despite their population shortage, emphasizes emancipation and black recruitment did not 
undermine the state’s unionist loyalty. On the contrary, these measures seemed to be what 
motivated Kentucky recruitment while Michigan and Wisconsin struggled.  
The argument Kentucky remained loyal to the Union despite the Emancipation 
Proclamation and black recruitment counters contemporary scholarship which argues that 
emancipation and black recruitment caused the Border State to cease its unionist support. 
However, examining Kentucky’s recruitment data emphasizes that was not the case. Kentucky 
would not have been able to have a voluntary recruitment surge in 1863 if emancipation and 
black recruitment hindered unionism. Examining Michigan and Wisconsin emphasizes 
Kentucky’s loyalty as both of these states desperately resorted to conscription, bounties, and 
black recruitment but yet could not provide the necessary troops. Emancipation and black 
recruitment, though unpopular in Kentucky, encouraged unionism as Kentuckians decided to fill 
their quota with the remnants of their white population to protect the integrity of the institution 
within the state. Many white Kentuckians hoped their military service to the Union would 
ultimately stabilize slavery and give the institution national legitimacy and protection. 
By the end of 1863, Kentucky had largely exhausted its white manpower. Although the 
state continued its attempts to delay invoking black recruitment by scrounging for more white 
troops, its available resources simply made it impossible. Continued guerrilla raids, the necessity 
for slave patrols, coupled with the general needs of businesses and farms, demanded many stay 
on the home front. Consequently, volunteerism declined and Kentucky, unable to meet its 




the Union would never permanently outlaw slavery, Kentuckians gradually but begrudgingly, 





Kentucky’s Military Exhaustion in 1864 and 1865 
By 1864 and 1865, Kentucky had exhausted its white manpower. Intending to preserve 
slavery and maintain its economic and racial status quo, Kentucky vigorously recruited in late 
1861, in response to Confederate General Polk’s invasion, and in 1863 to prevent the necessity 
of black recruitment. Although Kentucky’s recruiting efforts temporarily achieved these 
objectives, the state could not sustain these efforts indefinitely. Kentucky achieved a proportional 
service record, by the start of 1864, which Michigan and Wisconsin would not have until the 
conclusion of the war. Having lost thousands of potential recruits to the Confederacy, coupled 
with the necessity of maintaining strong state forces to fend-off guerrilla raids, Kentucky’s white 
population no longer had the ability to meet federal troop demands in 1864 and 1865. Scholars 
have contended that Kentucky’s reduced enlistments resulted from distaste for abolition, but this 
is not the case. Kentucky officials continually pressed the state’s population for white recruits, 
including draftees, to fill the quotas and negate black recruitment. However, such white 
manpower did not exist in the state which, coupled with the persistent efforts of black 
Kentuckians to enlist, forced white Kentuckians to reluctantly accept black recruitment. 
Consequently, Kentuckians had to allow black recruitment and conscription to meet their quotas 
during the final two years of the war.   
While white Kentuckians viewed black recruitment as a threat to their economic 
prosperity and white superiority, African Americans viewed it as an opportunity to free 
themselves. During these final two years, with white recruitment exhausted, thousands of black 
Kentuckians left slavery and enlisted in federal service. Kentucky produced the second highest 




African Americans’ desire to free themselves and disprove the racial assumptions of white 
supremacy. Although there were reports of forced conscription, the majority of Kentucky’s black 
recruits volunteered. While their white counterparts enlisted to preserve slavery, black 
Kentuckians enlisted to free themselves and dismantle the institution. 
Compared to Michigan and Wisconsin, Kentucky provided significantly fewer white 
troops in 1864 and 1865. Owing to these state’s larger manpower reserves, Michigan and 
Wisconsin experienced massive troop surges during these final two years. Utilizing bounties, 
substitution, black recruitment, and conscription, both states had developed efficient recruitment 
apparatuses allowing them to procure significantly higher numbers of troops than Kentucky. 
Furthermore, these states did not have to compete with Confederate recruiters nor did they 
require large state forces to protect their respective home fronts. Unlike Kentucky, Michigan and 
Wisconsin had the resources and the capability to furnish thousands of troops at this stage of the 
war. 
Kentucky’s poor white recruitment in 1864 and 1865 does not signify the state had given 
up on slavery or the Union. On the contrary, Kentuckians still hoped their service to the United 
States would preserve the institution. That is primarily why they managed to provide enough 
white recruits, mostly through veteran reenlistments, to delay black recruitment until April of 
1864. Kentuckians generally assumed the federal government’s efforts to enlist their slaves was a 
temporary war measure and the established laws of the Constitution would protect their long-
term interests. Once the war concluded, many white Kentuckians hoped they could rebuild the 
institution and reestablish the state’s pre-war prosperity. However, this perception changed 




slavery. Though still loyal, the sense of betrayal many Kentuckians felt as a result of the 
Amendment and the end of slavery, spurred pro-Confederate memory in the post-war years.  
In early 1864, Kentucky continued to delay black recruitment by attempting to mobilize 
as many white recruits as possible. Required to raise 5,758 men by March, the state attempted to 
stimulate white volunteerism. In February, Governor Bramlette sought to reassure the War 
Department by stating, “we are ready to fill our quota from the ‘free’ white citizens of 
Kentucky…. [w]e shall meet the call upon us without enlisting colored men.”1 In March, the 
Louisville Weekly Journal wrote, “while our State is being exhausted, let us hear no more of this 
senseless clamor and pitiful objurgating” regarding black recruitment. The editors wrote, “whole 
districts of the State have been depopulated, and others have never been protected…from 
marauding guerillas; we have not the population, the resources, or the able-bodied men we had in 
1860.”2 Similarly, Kentucky Congressman Brutus Clay reiterated how implementing black 
recruitment, “because we have not furnished our quota with the balance of the States,” was 
unfounded as the War Department had “not given us an opportunity” to fill the quota with white 
men.3 Acting on this determination to prevent black recruitment, Kentucky managed to recruit 69 
percent, or 6,736 white men, of its recruits for 1864 during the first three months of the year.4 
These men represented the final significant number of white troops for Kentucky. During the rest 
of the year, the state could only procure an additional 3,890 to meet its total quota of 20,383.5  
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Kentucky's Confederate enlistees overtaxed the state’s white manpower preventing the 
state from meeting its federal quota in 1864. The median value of scholarly estimates places 
Kentucky’s Confederate recruits around 32,500 throughout the war.6 Owing to insufficient 
Confederate recruiting data, it is difficult to determine the precise quantity and year in which 
these men enlisted in rebel service. Conceivably, two major events, both occurring prior to 1864, 
would have spurred the majority of these recruits to rally in Southern units. The first was the 
initial firing on Fort Sumter in 1861, and the second was the combined Emancipation 
Proclamation, black recruitment, and conscription in 1863. Although no Confederate recruitment 
data explicitly emphasizes these events as inciting support, they do arguably represent the most 
likely time for rebel sympathizers in the state to volunteer.7 The Confederate invasions of 1861 
and 1862 may have spurred rebel enlistments, owing to the proximity and relative ease of joining 
nearby armies.8 Assuming most of Kentucky’s Confederate recruits enlisted during these events, 
by January of 1864, 65 percent of Kentucky’s white military-aged population were in uniform.9 
Solely counting the percentage of the white adult male population that went into federal service, 
after removing the Confederate recruits from the population, one arrives at 55 percent which is 
still higher than Michigan or Wisconsin.10 
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Kentucky attempted to persuade the War Department to reduce its quotas based on the 
number of men who had gone to the Confederacy. According to the Lexington Observer and 
Reporter, federal “authorities have agreed to Governor Bramlette’s idea, that the quota of 
Kentucky shall be reduced 25,000, the number of her fighting population that went south. The 
Government says that what remains to be supplied can be from the white men of the State.”11 
Similarly, the Dollar Weekly Bulletin wrote a day later, “Governor Bramlette has induced the 
War Department to credit Kentucky on the draft 27,000 troops who have joined the confederate 
army.”12 The state premised these numbers on estimates since state officials had no means to 
accurately determine its Rebel recruits and did not seem to account for those Kentuckians 
serving in irregular forces within the state. The Official Records of the War of the Rebellion did 
not show a reduction of the quota resulting from this request, suggesting the federal government 
would not allow recruitment to slacken due to unsupported estimations. The only deductions the 
federal government granted Kentucky was for excess credits the state provided during previous 
calls.13 
Kentucky’s unstable home front further drained its white manpower as it necessitated that 
the state maintain a large militia force. Though Union soldiers garrisoned the state throughout 
the war, Kentucky had to organize a significant number of state troops to maintain internal 
stability. Facing southern sympathizers, Confederate military invasions and guerrilla 
bushwhackers, Kentucky organized dozens of small companies and a few regiments, amounting 
to 5,602 militia men, from 1861 through 1863.14 These troops were meant to combat Rebel raids 
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which had “swept… plantations so clean that, except in a very few instances, neither negroes nor 
planters have been ever heard of since.”15 The guerrilla fighting was so bad in Kentucky, Lincoln 
invoked martial law in the state on July 5, 1864.16 The state’s desire to perpetuate stability and 
protect property from destruction or thievery, necessitated this large force. If included with 
Kentucky’s total furnished troops, these militia men would have made the state’s proportional 
service record 69 percent by the start of 1864.17 According to this data, Kentucky had only 
42,760 white, military-aged males left in the state to fill recruitment demands.18 Though the 
federal government did not credit Kentucky for its militia forces, they were still vital to the 
state’s security and represented a legitimate strain on its manpower.19 
The numbers of state troops that Kentucky had to hold in reserve, did not compare with 
Michigan or Wisconsin which only needed a limited number of home guardsmen. The stark 
contrast between Kentucky and these two states is evident in the reported numbers for each 
state’s militia. Michigan maintained a force of 400, whose only job was to “sustain a feeling of 
security” and prevent “raids by southern rebel refugees from…Canada.”20  Wisconsin’s home 
guard meanwhile, described as an “utter failure” by the Adjutant General, boasted around 879 
men whose job was to enforce the draft and occasionally patrol for Indians.21  Neither Michigan 
nor Wisconsin had to commit serious resources to maintain their respective home guards. 
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Although Kentucky had to sustain such a large number of state troops, it still met or exceeded its 
federal quotas up until 1864, while Michigan and Wisconsin struggled. 
The war drained Kentucky’s white manpower, causing the state’s agricultural capabilities 
to diminish. Governor Bramlette commented in January, 1864 how “a large portion of our 
productive labor had been driven from the State, and the arm of industry was greatly 
paralyzed.”22 Kentucky’s lucrative tobacco industry, valued at $291,496,955 before the war, 
struggled to find workers by July, illustrating this paralysis.23 The Maysville Weekly Bulletin 
reported, “Kentucky farmers are in Indiana in search of laborers to till their Tobacco crops. 
Extravagant wages are offered.”24 Although Kentucky’s agricultural enterprises still remained 
capable of “supply[ing] all our demands,” the Louisville Weekly Journal observed how the 
“withdrawal of labor tells upon this production.” Despite “mechanical ingenuities… [which] 
have made one poor man equal to two good men” the increasing labor shortages “tell against the 
ability of exportation.”25 Although it is hard to determine Kentucky’s agricultural capabilities 
during the final two years of the war, a labor shortage among its white men existed and appeared 
to affect the state’s agricultural economy.  
Kentucky’s lost white manpower meant the state increasingly relied on slave labor to 
support the economy. The Maysville Weekly Bulletin commented on how “the merchants, the 
manufacturers, the mechanics, and all classes of laboring men…have been immensely benefitted 
by the fruits of negro slavery.”26 In August, the Louisville Weekly Journal expressed the 
                                                          
22 Thomas E. Bramlette, “Message of Governor T. E. Bramlette to the General Assembly of Kentucky, at their 
Adjourned Session of 1863-4,” January 4, 1865 (Frankfort: Kentucky Department for Libraries and Archives)    
23 United States Census Bureau, Agricultural Report of 1860, 62. 
24 Ross and Rosser, Maysville Weekly Bulletin, July 14, 1863.   
25 Geo D. Prentice ad Paul R. Shipman, “Agricultural Necessities,” Louisville Weekly Journal, May 31, 1863. 




importance of slave labor by arguing how the state’s interests “are so inextricably interwoven 
with the slave institution that its defense against immediate abolition was a necessity.”27 The 
prominence of slavery in 1864 contrasts with the state’s formally integrated society, which relied 
on both free-labor and chattel property. Signifying the importance of the institution to replace the 
white laborers who had enlisted, Governor Bramlette reasoned, “slave labor was therefore an 
important item to be secured against destruction.” 28  
Kentucky’s implementation of conscription in 1864 emphasizes the state’s white 
manpower shortage. Hoping to fill its quota with white men but fearful volunteers might be hard 
to obtain, Kentucky began conscription for the first time in January of 1864. Of the 9,648 white 
men Kentucky raised in 1864, 491 were draftees while 531 paid substitutes.29 Similar to 
Michigan and Wisconsin, Kentucky’s use of conscription sought to increase volunteerism. The 
Border State’s recruiters often articulated, “volunteers will receive the liberal bounty and 
increased pay offered by the Government; the conscript will not. Volunteers select their own 
company and regiment---the conscript will be assigned…The volunteer will be honored…the 
conscript will not.”30 However, Kentucky’s use of conscription does not imply the state no 
longer favored the Union. Kentucky’s service record as of January 1864, shows the state had 
nearly exhausted its white manpower and could no longer procure enough volunteers to prevent 
black recruitment. Kentucky’s draft represents a desperate effort to commit as many white men 
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as possible and may have been what allowed the state to furnish the white volunteers it did 
despite its significant manpower shortages. 
Kentuckians attempted to fill their quota by relying on veteran reenlistments. According 
to the Adjutant General Report, 6,870 veterans reenlisted in 1864. Representing 71 percent of its 
troops enlisted that year, Kentucky furnished more veteran troops than either Michigan or 
Wisconsin. Departing from the scholarly consensus that Kentucky was no longer loyal after 
1863, these veterans “reaffirmed that unfaltering loyalty, the noble characteristic of Kentucky’s 
sons,” by reenlisting “to restore our government to its original status.” Kentuckians were so 
pleased that veterans were reenlisting, the Daily Commonwealth reminded “Kentucky’s fair 
daughters” that of these soldiers, “scarcely one of them is married.” The editors said “it behooves 
them (women) to reward these gallant and meritorious officers with far more acceptable and 
richer honors than barbecues, balls, [or] showy demonstrations.”31 The Louisville Weekly Journal 
expressed the importance of these returning soldiers by stating, “every available veteran soldier 
must be sent forward to give the coup de grace to the infamous conspiracy” as “a few months of 
sacrifice will end the war, restore peace, and permit us all to return to the avocations which 
employed us before” the war.32  Despite fears of abolitionist influence, thousands of Kentucky’s 
field soldiers volunteered to help fill the quota.33 Whether from patriotic sentiment, or the federal 
bounty of $402 and the thirty-day furlough, Kentucky veterans turned out in significant numbers. 
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Nevertheless though, veteran reenlistments were still unable to complete the state’s quota with 
white men. 
In April of 1864, black recruitment officially began in Kentucky. Although some 
enrolling and recruiting of Kentucky’s African Americans occurred in January of 1864, when 
Colonel Richard Cunningham offered freedom as well as a bounty of $300 to prospective black 
recruits, white Kentuckians protested and quickly stifled the effort.34 However, towards the end 
of March, white enlistments began to taper off. In accordance with Governor Bramlette’s 
assertion that “if Kentucky fails to furnish her quota of white men, then enough negroes may be 
taken to make up the deficiency,” federal recruiters began encouraging black Kentuckians to 
enlist.35  
General Stephen Burbridge, commander of the military district of Kentucky, issued 
General Order No. 34 and officially began enlisting black Kentuckians. The order allowed 
federal recruiters to begin enlisting or drafting “all able-bodied negro slaves and free colored 
persons of lawful age,” but received backlash from Kentuckians who did not want the army to 
take their slaves.36 Hoping to assuage dissatisfaction regarding black recruitment, Burbridge’s 
orders allowed recruiting agents to give loyal slave masters a “certificate…as will enable him to 
receive from the Government the compensation authorized by law for such recruits.” Amounting 
to $300 per slave, it essentially represented a form of compensated emancipation which 
Kentuckians had rejected in 1862.37 Owing to the controversial nature of the enterprise, 
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Burbridge further stipulated that black recruits were to be “at once forwarded to the general 
rendezvous at Louisville; thence forwarded…outside of the State” to limit possible 
disturbances.38 Under these provisions, black recruitment commenced in Kentucky by April 8th, 
1864.39 
The addition of black soldiers allowed Kentucky’s recruitment to increase from 9,648 to 
29,417 men; 3,000 more than its 1864 quota demanded.40 Although the state’s records were 
“incomplete in numbers…owing to the fact that their (black) recruitment was made wholly 
independent” by federal officers, it is conceivable that the difference was made up of black 
troops.41 Accordingly, 19,765 African Americans enlisted in Kentucky during 1864.42 This large 
number of black soldiers, something Kentucky had been able to avoid for almost a year and a 
half, testifies to the total exhaustion of its white population. Evident through its newspapers and 
state proclamations, Kentucky was still adamantly against black recruiting but could no longer 
delay it with white volunteers.  
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This graph emphasizes the importance of black recruiting in Kentucky during 1864 and 1865. After 
Kentucky exhausted its white manpower, black recruits made up the majority of the state’s enlistments.43 
 
When black recruitment officially began in Kentucky, thousands of African Americans 
enthusiastically volunteered. 44 The Louisville Weekly Journal noted how “the negro recruits” 
were enlisting “in the proper spirit” and “that the number is daily and rapidly increasing…[as] a 
squad of about seventy-five negro recruits arrived last night on the Frankfort train.”45 It makes 
sense this Louisville newspaper was commenting on the arrival of black soldiers, as Burbridge 
had made the city the primary rendezvous. In Owen County, just northeast of Louisville, Major 
Farris enrolled “two hundred and twenty-six slaves and four-teen free men of color.”46 Federal 
control over the black recruitment apparatus was so effective through 1864 that agents enlisted 
62 percent of Kentucky’s African American military-aged population, effectively exhausting it.47   
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By 1865, Kentucky’s recruitment efforts had drained its white and black military-aged 
populations. According to the Adjutant General Report, Kentucky furnished 3,190 white men 
during the first four months of 1865, falling far short of its 10,481 quota.48 Subsequently, federal 
recruiters enlisted or conscripted 3,938 black Kentuckians for service bringing the state’s total 
troop contribution to 7,128.49 Evident by this data, Kentucky had depleted both its white 
manpower and its military-aged black population. The high proportion of Kentucky’s black 
enlistments in 1864 may explain why black Kentuckians could not complete the state’s 1865 
quota. The diminished black enlistments helped prompt Congress in March of 1865 to not only 
grant freedom and a federal bounty to the recruit, but to also free their wives and children.50 
Affidavits from black Kentuckians serving at Camp Nelson especially testify to the importance 
of family. George Washington, of the 123rd United States Colored Infantry, wrote to Lincoln 
asking for a discharge to better provide for his family whom “a hard master” still owned. 51 
Joseph Miller, a black soldier at Camp Nelson, asked for the army to allow his family to dwell 
within the confines of the base as they “had no place to go.”52 Conceivably, many of Kentucky’s 
black soldiers enlisted with the hope the federal government would free and help care for their 
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families. 53 Ironically, while Kentucky’s white adult male population exhausted itself to preserve 
slavery, their black counterparts depleted their manpower to abolish it.  
Black recruitment in Kentucky was effective. Between April of 1864 and April 1865, the 
federal government credited Kentucky with 23,703 African American troops.54 Considering the 
military-aged free-black and slave populations in 1860, which amounted to 31,835, the state 
furnished 74 percent of its black population to Union forces.55 Black refugees from the Deep 
South may also have enlisted in Kentucky as there was a large contraband camp outside of 
Columbus, Kentucky. It is hard to determine how many African American migrants enlisted in 
Kentucky but it is conceivable that federal recruiters enticed as many as possible to join.56 
Coupled with the added troops from migrating African Americans, Kentucky recruited more 
black soldiers than any other state except for Union-occupied Louisiana.57 However, this does 
not testify to white Kentuckians’ willingness to enlist blacks. Federal dominance, coupled with 
constant troop needs, trumped Kentucky’s reservations regarding the “abduction of slaves from 
their masters,” explaining why the black recruiting apparatus was so efficient.58  
While Kentucky had exhausted its manpower by the start of 1864, Michigan maintained a 
large reserve and began calling upon it during this latter stage of the war. Up until the start of 
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1864, Michigan furnished a minuscule percentage of its men compared to Kentucky. By January, 
Michigan had offered 53,743 volunteers, or 43 percent of its eligible males, to the war.59 
Compared to Kentucky’s 69 percent, Michigan’s manpower reserves were quite healthy as it 
entered 1864.60 Michigan utilized these men and soon dwarfed Kentucky’s white recruits by 
enlisting 27,616 total men that year: its highest amount during the war.61 To explain this 
difference, one must again examine the public discourse to determine how the state, though 
falling slightly short of its 29,945 quota, produced so many troops.62  
In 1864, Michiganders seemed invigorated as they supplied their largest number of 
recruits. Governor Austin Blair declared in January “recruiting has been brought back to the 
standard of enthusiasm of the first year of the war, and the ability of the State still to fill its 
quotas by the process of voluntary enlistments, has been proven beyond a doubt.”63 Before state 
officials knew the actual returns, there was already a high degree of optimism. Blair declared 
“this has been accomplished by the offering of liberal bounties to the volunteers” which made 
the Governor “convinced that no contrivance has yet been adopted which can compare in 
efficiency with the local bounty for procuring enlistments into the military service.”64  
Michigan’s reliance on bounties implies patriotic fervor had largely dissipated. In 
Hillsdale, after talking about raising a “special township bounty” which “affords $200, over and 
above Government bounties,” the editors stated “liberality and patriotism go hand in hand.”65 
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Throughout the state such sentiment was common as towns competed to offer enough money to 
prospective recruits. In Lansing, town officials complained about how “a recruit is at liberty to 
enlist where he sees fit, or where he can obtain the largest bounty” and though “this may seem to 
be somewhat unjust on the face of it” there was “no law to prevent it.”66 Such competition for 
recruits, perhaps creating a financial burden for localities, helped fill the state’s quotas.67  
Political partisanship still existed in Michigan but did not hinder recruitment as it may 
have during previous recruitment drives. Although the issue of emancipation divided many 
Michiganders, they mutually sought to preserve the Union. Democrats noted they had not 
“mistak[en] or magnify[ied] the evil of abolition influences…three years ago.”68 Conservatives 
also expressed how they would “thank God humbly and heartily if we might but get back to that 
old Union of peace and prosperity” and to cease offering “freedom to him who is unprepared for 
it is a load of chains.”69 However, Democrats still contended, “the aim and object of the 
democratic party is to preserve the federal union and rights of the states,” and that “we are 
engaged in a desperate struggle for national existence, and… no necessary sacrifice of life or 
property can be deemed too great.”70 The Grand Haven News told Republicans to “make your 
words good by your deeds… [by] report[ing] yourselves to the nearest recruiting station…. [as] 
there is no longer need of abolition words, we wants deeds.”71 Despite Democratic opposition to 
abolition, they still intended to preserve the Union.72 It is hard to measure exactly how many 
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Michigan Democrats enlisted in 1864, but owing to the state’s recruitment data, it is reasonable 
to assume thousands volunteered. 
Michigan’s Republicans continued supporting the Lincoln Administration, as well as the 
war effort, by promoting volunteerism and assaulting perceived Democratic idleness. Republican 
Governor Austin Blair exhorted Michiganders to enlist “with the promptness and energy which 
has characterized our people since the war began,” and to bring back “our recruiting 
machinery…into full operation….so that their country and its free institution may continue to 
exist.”73 Arguing the Governor’s message was an embodiment of “patriotism, justice and sound 
policy,” the Cass County Republican reasoned “with a patriotism and courage worthy of 
everlasting remembrance they (recruits) have periled everything [so] that their country and its 
free institutions may continue to exist.”74 Hoping to reprimand Democrats for their objections to 
serving in an abolitionist war, the Lansing State Republican maintained, “the simple fact is that 
the actions and utterances of some democrats, few, I believe, in number but prominent in 
position, have excited a distrust of the patriotism of the democratic party (sic)."75 The Hillsdale 
Standard similarly stated, “the Copperheads can gratify their love of the Union and their hatred 
of the negro at the same time, by enlisting to fight for the Union and against the negroes in the 
rebel armies.”76 Campaigning for the presidential election in November, Republicans intended to 
build support for Lincoln’s prosecution of the war while accusing Democrats of subversive 
inactivity. Republican and Democratic proponents continued to lash out at one another, but 
nonetheless maintained an element of bipartisanship allowing recruiting to continue unabated.77 
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Michigan was then able to draw upon its immense reservoir of manpower to put some serious 
weight behind its war effort 
Black recruitment, although sanctioned by the state, remained a politically divisive issue. 
Democrats, distraught about how black troops affected prisoner exchanges, questioned the merit 
of black soldiers. The East Saginaw Courier commented, “forty thousand of our white soldiers 
are dying…at Andersonville…. It is therefore, his (Lincoln’s) arbitrary caprice, and devotion to 
negroes, in preference to white men, which condemns to death” these prisoners.78 Having made 
the war one to free the slaves, Democrats asked if Lincoln “would sacrifice 500,000 more white 
men in this negro crusade?”79 Republicans countered Democratic claims against emancipation 
and black recruitment by reaffirming the military necessity of these measures. The Hillsdale 
Standard reiterated, “they (black soldiers) are disciplined for months before they take the field” 
and argued any perceived wrongness or “ferocity of the slaves is insignificant in comparison 
with that of their masters.”80 Referring to a Union assault at New Market, Virginia, the Lansing 
State Republican devoted an article to “the colored troops, under Gen. Paine.” The editors 
commented that the charge of these black troops “was one of the grandest features of the 
operations… they never halted or faltered, though their ranks were sadly thinned, as they 
advanced to the successful accomplishment of their task.”81 Emphasizing black troops as capable 
soldiers, Michigan Republicans defended black recruitment as a necessary and valuable asset to 
the war effort. 
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Despite Michigan’s partisan views regarding African American soldiers, the state 
continued black recruitment throughout the duration of the war. However, Michigan’s Adjutant 
General did not provide accurate information regarding the state’s black troops. The “Provost 
Marshal’s Department in this State… [had] not preserved the distinctions necessary to this 
classification.” The report does offer an “approximate idea…of the number of colored troops 
sent from Michigan,” which show “1,453 men were recruited for the 102d U.S. (1st Michigan,) 
Colored Infantry.”82 The 1860 Census indicated Michigan had only 1,257 military-aged, free-
black males.83 This discrepancy does not necessarily mean Michigan’s recruitment or population 
data was incorrect, rather population sizes may have changed due to the northward migration of 
former slaves.84 In other words, former slaves migrating to Michigan may have swelled the 
state’s African American population, rendering it capable of recruiting more black soldiers than 
the 1860 Census would indicate were available.85 
Another explanation for Michigan’s successful utilization of black recruitment is that it 
may have enlisted African Americans who dwelled in other states. Interestingly enough, in late 
January, Michigan recruiters asked Governor Bramlette if they could enlist Kentucky blacks for 
the First Michigan Colored Cavalry. Unsurprisingly, Bramlette told them “no such recruiting will 
be tolerated here” and “summary justice will be inflicted upon any who attempt such unlawful 
purpose.”86 It is reasonable to assert that Michigan obtained some black recruits from other 
states, explaining why the state recruited a regiment larger than its population could support. 
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Despite political disagreements regarding emancipation, Michigan’s desire to fill its quota 
transcended partisanship and fostered black recruitment. 
The primary reason for Michigan’s successful recruiting efforts in 1864 stem from its 
established recruiting apparatus. Over the course of the war, Michigan became proficient in 
obtaining and offering bounties, significantly stimulating volunteerism. In early February, 
Michigan instituted rules “contain[ing] provisions intended to cover all formal and informal 
action of citizens… for the purpose of raising or offering bounties to volunteers.” This Bounty 
Law, “provid[ed] a uniform rate of bounties…of $100 to all volunteers…who enlist upon the 
quota of the township…they are enrolled.”87 Essentially, this provision remedied many of the 
issues which previously plagued the state’s recruitment. Raising local bounties was still 
important as the Cass County Republican reported, “our citizens should go to work at once; 
meetings should be held in each town; bounties raised, and the proper efforts made to secure the 
credits of veteran soldiers.”88 Although local competitive bounties still existed, Michigan’s $100 
bounty law helped equalize recruitment by allowing poorer communities a better opportunity to 
retain their young men. 
Veteran reenlistments were instrumental to Michigan’s effective recruiting system in 
1864. The state’s experienced field regiments, most of whom enlisted for three-year terms in 
1861, were nearing the end of their enlistment contracts. Michigan, as well as the federal 
government, wished to preserve these veteran units by respectively offering a $100 and $400 
reenlistment bounty, as well as a thirty-day furlough.89 This financial compensation, coupled 
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with strong “ideological convictions and a determination to finish the job,” led 5,545 men, or 20 
percent of Michigan’s recruits in 1864, to reenlist as Veteran Regiments.90 Furthermore, “every 
citizen [was] interested in the matter” as the state credited these veterans to the locales “where 
they were originally enlisted and mustered.”91 Though the state and federal government offered 
these experienced troops bounties and furloughs, incentives many of these men did not enjoy 
upon their initial enlistment, patriotism primarily drove veteran troops who knew war’s 
“hardships” back into the service.92 Subsequently, veteran troops helped fill Michigan’s quota 
while simultaneously giving some communities a reprieve from conscription. 
Despite volunteerism and veteran reenlistments, Michigan still instituted a draft. The 
state had attempted to reach its quota with volunteers and both Democratic and Republican 
newspapers urged bipartisan volunteerism to avoid conscription. The Democratic Grand Haven 
News wrote, “the President… has ordered out five hundred thousand more troops…if they are 
not then ready a draft will take them. Let our citizens respond at once to the call, as it is our 
duty…we will unloose our purse-strings and work!”93 Similarly, the Republican newspaper, the 
Hillsdale Standard wrote, “let every exertion be put forth to secure men. Remember, tat [sic] so 
long as recruits are offered for muster no draft will take place—as the orders are not to wait, the 
men will have to be forthcoming.”94 Both political parties sought to avoid the draft by urging 
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citizens to either raise bounties or volunteer. Their efforts were not completely successful, 
forcing the state to conscript 1,956 men in 1864.95  
Michigan’s efficient recruitment practices, coupled with its manpower reserves, allowed 
the state to provide significantly more troops than Kentucky. Overcoming the political 
partisanship which had previously plagued the state’s recruitment efforts, Michigan was able to 
mobilize more recruits in 1864 than at any other time. Despite having a draft, Michigan’s 
Adjutant General reported, “the striking fact is… that during ten months only of the present year, 
the State of Michigan has furnished more than half as many men for the service as…during the 
whole of the first three years of the war.”96  Michigan’s recruiting apparatus, including effective 
bounties and veteran reenlistments, proved successful at obtaining relatively large numbers of 
troops. 
Extending into 1865, Michigan continued to utilize its manpower reserves by furnishing 
the second highest number of troops relative to Kentucky and Wisconsin. Having a quota of 
10,026, Michigan recruited 9,382 men.97 Although the state conscripted 1,782 of these troops, it 
continued a strong recruitment drive during the final months of the war.98 In January, the 
Hillsdale Standard noted the necessity “of adopting at once... a thorough, vigilant and persistent 
system of recruiting, to fill and keep full all calls for troops…until it shall be evident no more 
will be required.” 99 Michiganders felt “in a contest of exhaustion…the object of each is to so use 
up the energy of his antagonist so that he can fight no longer” and no one could “tell which blow 
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shall be the final one.”100 Consequently, Michigan continued drawing upon its manpower 
reserves and its effective recruiting apparatus during the first four months of 1865. 
Wisconsin, until the start of 1864, only provided a small number of troops compared to 
Kentucky. Having furnished 50,970 troops, or 42 percent of its white adult male population, 
Wisconsin maintained a large reserve of manpower entering 1864.101 The state had struggled 
throughout 1863, with illegitimate recruiting officers, political divisions, corruption, and war 
weariness.102 In 1864 though, Wisconsin committed much of its reserves by enlisting 27,312 
recruits while only having to draft 1,918.103 Although this did not fill its quota of 42,887, it still 
represents an almost 300 percent increase from the prior year and shows strong effort to mobilize 
its manpower reserves.104  
The primary reason for Wisconsin’s recruitment surge centers on the state’s amended 
recruiting services. Similar to Michigan, bounties were vitally important during this stage of the 
war to entice volunteers.105 The state had had issues granting men their promised money, owing 
to Wisconsin’s unsanctioned recruiters, which appeared to have weakened the state’s previous 
recruitment efforts. To solve this, newly elected Republican Governor, James T. Lewis, 
“redeem[ed] certificates issued for bounty volunteers,” allowing only state-approved recruiting 
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officers to offer bounties.106 Recruitment posters, such as those presented in the Wood County 
Reporter, soon responded by advertising that government “detailed… recruiting officers” were 
offering bounties to recruits.107 Commenting on the state’s control over enlistments, Governor 
Lewis issued General Orders Number 5: A and B, establishing strict guidelines for recruiting 
officers. Lewis stipulated “all persons holding recruiting appointments…are hereby ordered to 
make immediate report to this office, of the number of men enlisted for their respective 
organizations. Failure to report immediately, will be deemed sufficient reasons for a revocation 
of the appointment and consequent loss of commission.”108 Such orders remedied Wisconsin’s 
convoluted recruiting service by making “the business of raising volunteers to fill the 
quota…satisfactory.”109 These incentives may explain why Wisconsin enjoyed higher numbers 
of recruits.110  
Although Wisconsinites solved their issues with the recruiting service, their underlying 
political and class divisions hindered volunteerism. Many Democrats responded to the state’s 
quota and threat of a draft by rioting in places such as Ozaukee County. This resistance may have 
hindered volunteerism in the state. Many Wisconsinites asserted, “when Lincoln…finally drifted 
into the embrace of the Abolition party and made the war a war for the purpose of 
revolutionizing the Government…the people became alarmed… and now demand in thunderous 
tones, a change of policy, and a change of rulers.”111 Furthermore, referencing commutation, 
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Democrats expressed how “the wealthy…enjoy[ed] an advantage over others.”112 Democrats, 
mostly German and Irish immigrants, were averse to abolition and commutation. The turmoil 
they created spurred the federal government to take over Wisconsin’s draft and deploy a small 
contingent of troops to Ozaukee County to maintain order.113 Concerns regarding abolition and 
corruption perhaps warranted the Adjutant General to report at the end of 1864, “recruiting [had] 
ceased almost entirely.”114 Political and economic divisions may have hindered Wisconsin’s 
recruitment during the latter stages of 1864, partially explaining why the state failed to meet its 
quota. 
Republicans generally supported abolition and Lincoln’s management of the war. The 
Mineral Point Weekly Tribune addressed Democratic claims that Lincoln created “a republican 
war, an abolition war,” by discussing secession and Fort Sumter and asking “in what way…was 
the administration responsible?”115 The Wood County Reporter stated, “if slavery was the 
original cause of the war, is it not our duty to continue it (the war) until…the last chain is broken, 
that a like conflict may not be entailed upon your posterity and mine?”116 Republicans also 
addressed commutation and class distinctions by arguing, “with a litle [sic] patriotic effort and 
without any serious inconvenience to their well-filled purses” wealthy men should “furnish to the 
country a soldier as their immediate representative in the Union army.”117 Republican 
Wisconsinites supported Lincoln’s implementation of emancipation as a necessary consequence 
of southern warmongering. Although Republicans in the Dodgeville Chronicle, deemed 
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examples of racial miscegenation “as a hard lick on our party,” they still endorsed 
emancipation.118 As evident in these articles, Republicans stalwartly supported Lincoln and 
sought to label their Democratic counterparts as subversive agents to the war effort. 
Despite political issues on the home front, Wisconsin’s field soldiers helped bolster the 
state’s recruiting numbers. To help incentivize these veterans, many communities such as 
Dodgeville, Wisconsin, “magnanimously agreed to give our re-enlisted veterans the bounty of 
$200 each.”119 Coupled with the $402 federal bounty and the thirty-day furlough all veterans 
received, these incentives perhaps encouraged many Wisconsinites to reenlist. Patriotism and 
group cohesion may also have spurred veterans, such as Rufus Dawes, to renew their service. 
Dawes noted in 1864, when his three-year enlistment term expired, “the inducement of pride, 
duty, patriotism and personal preservation” drove him and his men to “stand together till the 
last.”120 Military experience transcended politics, motivating Dawes and 217 of the 285 survivors 
of the Sixth Wisconsin to reenlist and maintain the integrity of the outfit.121 Apparently, “the cry 
of ‘Abolition War,’ raised by the home traitors, has no effect upon those who have…endured the 
hardships of camp life and exposed themselves to the missiles of death.”122 Whatever the reason, 
5,782 Wisconsinite veterans reenlisted in 1864.123 Representing 21 percent of Wisconsin’s 
recruiting for the year, returning veterans made up a significant portion of the state’s furnished 
troops. 
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Wisconsin also began recruiting African Americans to help fill its quota. Although the 
federal government had sanctioned the state to recruit blacks in October of 1863, recruiters were 
unable to organize enough troops to create a regiment. By 1864, Wisconsin renewed efforts to 
raise an African American regiment. Recruiting posters explicitly stated “recruits—white or 
colored” received a $100 bounty for each year they enlisted.124 These financial incentives, and a 
desire to serve, encouraged 250 black Wisconsinites to assemble as the Twenty-Ninth United 
States Colored Infantry under the command of Colonel John Bross.125 Representing 75 percent of 
Wisconsin’s 1860 African American population, it is likely the state recruited black Southern 
migrants, as had occurred in Kentucky and Michigan, to bolster these numbers.126 Scholars 
estimate that migrating African Americans from the Mississippi Valley and Missouri, increased 
Wisconsin’s black population to around 1,500 to 2,000 persons and the number of native black 
Wisconsinite soldiers was around 110 men.127 Regardless, the fact Wisconsin made efforts to 
mobilize its relatively small, free-black population, signifies the state’s desperate attempts to 
meet its federal quota. 
To help meet troop demands, Wisconsin’s recruiters may have begun enlisting minors for 
military service. Despite Adjutant General Augustus Gaylord’s 1863 orders to not enlist persons 
under the age of 18 without the consent of parents, Wisconsin’s recruiters may have become 
desperate by late summer of 1864. According to the Dodgeville Chronicle, General St. George 
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Cooke, the head of federal recruiting services, issued Captain J. B. Collins, in charge of 
Milwaukee’s recruitment, “an order directing him to enlist minors with or without the consent of 
their parents, provided… they are physically fit to ensure the hardships of military life.”128 
Countermanding General Gaylord’s earlier mandate, the War Department may have been 
unimpressed with Wisconsin’s recruiting service and implemented the enlistment of minors to 
help the state meet its quota. However, only a few newspaper articles testify to this practice and 
Gaylord did not provide evidence in his reports which alluded to this practice. It is difficult to 
prove the enlistment of minors was prevalent in Wisconsin in late 1864. The fact the state was 
still far from its quota suggests the practice may have occurred to procure more volunteers. 
Although it appears recruiting again slackened towards the end of the year, 1864 was still fruitful 
as the state dwarfed the efforts of white Kentuckians and matched those of Michigan. 
Whatever Wisconsin’s issues with recruiting were in 1864, the state solved them in 1865 
by procuring more men than Kentucky and Michigan. Enlisting 12,405 men, Wisconsin managed 
to meet its quota of 12,356 troops.129 Recruiting posters listed the officers in charge, the local, 
state, and government bounties, and even offered recruits “breech-loading repeating rifle[s]” 
which they had the opportunity “to retain…at the expiration of service.”130 Although the Provost 
Marshal General conscripted 2,465 men, recruiting seemed highly effective during the last four 
months of the war. The Dodgeville Chronicle, when describing the dismantlement of 
Wisconsin’s recruiting apparatus at the end of the war, noted “the occupation of bounty agents is 
gone. There is to be no more filling of quotas, no more draft meetings, no more speeches.”131 
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After furnishing a total of 90,686 men, or 74 percent of its military-aged population, Wisconsin 
finished the war with a comparable service record to both Kentucky and Michigan. 
 
This graph represent Kentucky’s total troop contribution to the Union as compared to Michigan and 
Wisconsin.132 
 
 Examining Michigan and Wisconsin’s recruitment efforts in 1864 and 1865 emphasizes 
Kentucky’s continued loyalty to the federal government. Although Michigan and Wisconsin 
furnished higher numbers of troops during this year and a half, they had the manpower reserves 
to do it which Kentucky lacked. Therefore, the Emancipation Proclamation and black 
recruitment did not undermine the Border State’s loyalty to the Union. Some Kentuckians were 
hostile to these measures, evident by the number of Kentuckians serving in conventional or 
irregular Confederate forces, but the broader state remained committed to the Union throughout 
most of 1864. The Louisville Weekly Journal noted how “the war cannot close, and peace cannot 
be restored, until the rebellion is crushed. There is no hope of the preservation of the Union 
without the strong arm, and it is therefore necessary to employ all the available strength of the 
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loyal people to accomplish what is so ardently desired.”133 Although many in the state were 
averse to Lincoln and favored McClellan during the 1864 election, they claimed to be proud 
“Union men of the Commonwealth” who favored “the Union of the Constitution and the 
Enforcement of the Laws.”134  
When the federal government began advocating for the Thirteenth Amendment during 
the spring of 1864, white Kentuckians remained loyal to the Union. The Amendment, proposed 
by Lincoln and the Republican Party, intended to permanently abolish slavery in the whole 
country. Conflicting with the interests of Kentuckians, they interestingly did not seem to believe 
the Amendment would affect long-term slavery in their state. In February, prior to the Senate 
vote, the Weekly Reporter stated, “these fanatic schemers seem to forget that their plan of 
operations may, at some future time, be reversed by the success of an opposing party.”135 Stated 
prior to the presidential election of 1864, many white Kentuckians appeared confident the 
Democratic Party would revoke any abolitionist policy after the November election. That may be 
why Kentucky, one of three states George McClellan won, gave him the highest marginal vote 
with 64,301 in favor and 27,786 voting for Lincoln.136  
During the early months of 1864, Kentuckians felt assured the broader Union did not 
want total emancipation. When the Senate passed the Thirteenth Amendment on April 8, 1864, 
Kentuckians claimed Union military authorities pressured Maryland in favor of the measure. The 
Lexington Observer and Reporter argued, “take away your bayonets, and not one man in fifty 
would approve your amendment or recognise (sic) your authority.”137 White Kentuckians felt the 
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House of Representatives would not support “the adoption of this amendment… because it will 
take from the government all power to offer terms of adjustment which the rebels can accept.”138 
These expressions, in conjunction with the state’s white recruitment data through March of 1864, 
demonstrates that although slavery in Kentucky was under threat, many felt the institution was 
relatively safe. However, after they had exhausted their white manpower and began enlisting 
African Americans, Kentuckians became increasingly concerned about the future of slavery. 
In late 1864, the federal government increasingly unsettled white Kentuckians. Despite 
the state’s efforts to preserve its institutions, the growing momentum behind the Thirteenth 
Amendment, coupled with black recruitment, made many Kentuckians feel betrayed. In early 
September, the Maysville Weekly Bulletin noted, “the Administration has been faithful indeed to 
the interest of the nigger, and employed all its powers in his behalf….If Lincoln is entitled to the 
gratitude of the black, ought he not to receive the eternal curses and maledictions of the white 
race?”139 Increasingly, Kentucky’s objections transitioned from Lincoln’s administration to the 
apparatus of the federal government.140 Whereas Kentuckians had previously believed their 
loyalty granted them representation and protection, after Lincoln’s reelection they argued “the 
nation outside of Kentucky will have the power to free the slaves inside of it, by constitutional 
amendment, without the aid of a single Kentucky vote in or out of Congress.”141 With growing 
momentum for the Thirteenth Amendment, many Kentuckians felt the federal government was 
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forcing them to “see and endure an utter and most injurious breaking up and overthrow of their 
system of labor.”142 
On 31 January 1865, the House of Representatives passed the Thirteenth Amendment, 
effectively ending the institution many white Kentuckians had fought to preserve. Passing with 
the required two-thirds majority, the Amendment did not receive a single favorable vote from 
Kentucky.143 Although Governor Bramlette beseeched his fellow Kentuckians that it was better 
to “accept it unconditionally than to reject it altogether,” many did not acquiesce.144 In July, the 
Louisville Weekly Journal said the adoption of the Constitutional Amendment will begin by 
driving off white laborers, and capital will soon follow them, to some place not cursed by negro 
freedom.”145 John Combs of Versailles, Kentucky wrote a letter published by the Lexington 
Observer and Reporter which approached the issue of the Amendment under the guise of states’ 
rights. Combs asserted, “my opposition to the proposed amendment does not arise…in regard to 
the future of slavery” but rather on the premise “if the amendment is incorporated…let it be done 
by those who indorse…and not by those who regard it as an alarming invitation upon the great 
doctrines which underlie the system of government.”146 The Frankfort Commonwealth expressed 
how support for the “constitutional Amendment and negro equality” has not “been held by the 
Union party of Kentucky. The assertion to the contrary is untrue, and none know this better than 
those who make it.”147 
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Although some white Kentuckians supported the Thirteenth Amendment, such as 
Governor Bramlette, most did not.148 The Amendment threatened Kentucky’s economy and its 
social and racial stratification established since the antebellum period. While black Kentuckians 
received freedom and validation for their efforts serving the Union cause, white Kentuckians, 
serving on the same side, lost the institution they had hoped to preserve. It would not be until 
1976 that the Kentucky Legislature officially ratified the Thirteenth Amendment.149 
Consequently, from the end of 1864 to the conclusion of the war, many white Kentuckians felt 
the Union had betrayed their interests by abolishing slavery. This sense of betrayal spurred pro-
Confederate sympathies and influenced the wartime memory and society of the state during post-
war Reconstruction.150 
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Slavery was the key factor in Kentucky’s unionism during the American Civil War. The 
state’s economy and society had centered on the institution of slavery since the antebellum 
period. White Kentuckians profited from the institution as a source of labor and economic 
investment while simultaneously appreciating the racial superiority the hierarchy of a slave 
society afforded them. When the Civil War began in April of 1861, Kentuckians chose to remain 
neutral as the best way to safeguard their institution from a potentially disruptive conflict. When 
the Confederacy threatened Kentucky’s sovereignty and stability by invading in September 1861, 
the state officially abandoned neutrality by siding with the Union. Hoping to utilize the power of 
the federal government and the laws of the Constitution to protect the internal stability of the 
state, thousands of white Kentuckians enlisted in the federal army. 
Throughout the duration of the war, the majority of Kentucky’s white adult male 
population entered military service to defend slavery. Adding Kentucky’s federal recruits with its 
militia, the state furnished a total of 79,069 white men to the Union cause. If one does not count 
the rebel recruits, the state mobilized 73 percent of its remaining white population for Union 
service by the end of the war.1 Kentucky’s service record compares to Michigan’s 72 percent and 
Wisconsin’s 74 percent, emphasizing that despite fears of abolition, Kentuckians were generally 
committed to the Union cause. 
The majority of white Kentuckians remained loyal to the Union but some still 
volunteered for Confederate service. Owing to a lack of primary source evidence though, 
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historians have only offered broad estimates of Kentucky’s total number of rebel soldiers, 
ranging between 25,000 and 40,000. Assuming the median value of this estimate, 32,500 
Kentuckians, or 23 percent of the state’s white adult male population, served in conventional or 
guerrilla Confederate outfits throughout the war.2 However, that does not necessarily imply these 
men enlisted at a constant rate in Confederate service during the conflict. 
Perhaps similar to Kentucky’s Union recruitment, the majority of Kentucky’s rebels 
volunteered at two different periods. The first Confederate recruitment period occurred in 1861. 
After the initial fighting at Fort Sumter and First Bull Run, rage militaire encouraged thousands 
of Southern-sympathizing Kentuckians to enlist in Tennessee despite the state’s neutrality.3 
Hoping to stop Rebel recruitment and enforce neutrality, Kentucky’s unionist legislature stopped 
funding the southern-sympathizing State Guard, ordered them to surrender their arms, and give 
an oath of allegiance to the federal government. In response, Simon Buckner led several 
thousand of the State Guard, and other Kentucky Rebels, into the Confederacy during the late 
summer of 1861.4 The second period of Kentucky’s Confederate recruitment occurred in 1863. 
The Emancipation Proclamation, black recruitment, and the draft threatened to force white 
Kentuckians to serve a federal cause which sought to dismantle slavery. Kentuckians may have 
flocked to Confederate standards to avoid having to serve in federal service. Conceivably, these 
two periods spurred the majority of Kentucky’s southern-sympathizers to enlist in rebel service 
by the end of 1863.5 
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The two surges of Kentucky Confederate recruitment emphasize slavery as the primary 
motivator. Similar to their unionist counterparts who viewed the federal government as a means 
to protect slavery, Kentucky’s rebels intended to utilize the bourgeoning Confederacy as a means 
to preserve the institution. Consequently, it is reasonable to argue that white Kentuckians, 
regardless of allegiance, generally fought for the same purpose. The only factor they disagreed 
on was which side best served the state’s interests. However, as recruitment data emphasizes, the 
majority of white Kentuckians remained loyal to the federal government. 
Aside from Confederate recruiting, the need to maintain a large state militia further 
strained Kentucky’s white manpower. Recruited periodically as the need arose, primarily from 
Confederate invasion, guerrilla activity, or runaway slaves, Kentucky devoted a total of 6,668 
men to its state forces during the war.6 The large force Kentucky allocated to its militia 
emphasizes the state’s desire to maintain a semblance of protection from Confederate forces 
while simultaneously controlling the slave population. Neither Michigan nor Wisconsin had to 
commit such serious resources to their respective home guards. Michigan’s 400 militia men and 
Wisconsin’s 879 guardsmen, whose primary job was to enforce the draft and occasionally patrol 
for Indians, do not compare to Kentucky’s large state force.7 Though the federal government did 
not count Kentucky’s militia towards the state’s service record, this force is significant as it 
placed an additional strain on the state’s depleted white male population. 
Emancipation and black recruitment did not significantly reduce Kentucky unionism. 
Since Kentucky’s entry into the conflict, the state had maintained a comparable service record to 
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Michigan and Wisconsin. During the final four months of 1861, Kentucky furnished 23 percent 
of its white manpower while Michigan and Wisconsin recruited 19 and 18 percent respectively.8 
In 1862 as well, Kentucky maintained a comparable service record by enlisting 32 percent of its 
white men compared to Michigan’s 31 percent and Wisconsin’s 34 percent.9 During 1863, 
Kentucky recruited 55 percent while Michigan and Wisconsin respectively enlisted 43 and 42 
percent. Throughout this year, Kentucky’s Union recruitment surged to complete the state’s 
quota without having to enlist African Americans. Kentucky’s desire to prevent black 
recruitment continued into early 1864 when the state enlisted 69 percent of its white troops for 
the year between January and March. By the end of March 1864, Kentucky’s total wartime 
service record stood at 67 percent. Kentucky’s percentage is significant when one considers that 
Michigan and Wisconsin did not reach the comparable service record of 64 percent until nine 
months later at the end of 1864. 10 Effectively, Kentucky exhausted the remainder of its white 
adult male population by the end of March 1864 and could no longer prevent black recruitment 
which began in April. In 1863 and early 1864, after the Emancipation Proclamation, black 
recruitment, and the draft, Kentucky furnished its final reserves of white manpower to the Union. 
These statistics prove Kentucky’s loyalty to the federal government in 1863 and early 1864.  
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Free from fear of abolition, Michigan and Wisconsin had no direct means to motivate 
recruitment aside from patriotism and bounties. Although concerns about a liberated black race 
migrating north for jobs discouraged many Michiganders and Wisconsinites from supporting the 
war, the broader state generally had no tangible link to slavery and accepted emancipation as a 
military necessity. Patriotic sentiment largely diminished after 1861 which seems to explain why 
Michigan and Wisconsin’s recruitment from 1861 to 1862 fell by 34 and 14 percent 
respectively.11 Michigan and Wisconsin used enlistment bounties and the threat of the draft to 
incentivize volunteering. By 1862, war weariness often overruled these temptations and 
significantly hindered volunteerism in both states. Despite the recruits Kentucky lost to the 
Confederacy, and to the state‘s large militia, the remaining white population volunteered to 
defend their stake in slavery and the society it supported. In comparison, Michiganders and 
Wisconsinites, unburdened by Confederate recruiting or insurgent warfare, consistently failed to 
meet troop quotas. Consequently, both states maintained significant, untapped manpower 
reserves well after Kentucky’s were exhausted. 
An efficient recruiting apparatus, complete with multi-tiered bounties, was the primary 
reason Michigan and Wisconsin procured similar numbers of recruits to Kentucky. Whereas 
Kentuckians managed to fill their quotas without having to significantly rely on local or state 
bounties, Michigan and Wisconsin’s efforts relied on financial incentives to obtain volunteers. 
Earlier in the war, Michigan had problems with competitive local bounties, which undermined 
recruitment in poorer locales, and Wisconsin had issues with unofficial recruiting agents who 
promised bounties without state authorization. By 1864 and 1865, Michigan and Wisconsin had 
                                                          
11 I calculated this number by dividing the state’s recruitment difference between 1861 and 1862 by the original 
number. Michigan: 8,386 divided by 24,281 equals 34 percent. Wisconsin 3,185 divided by 22,625 equals 14 




solved these issues. Michigan began offering extra compensation which helped equalize bounties 
between locales and encouraged men to enlist in their hometown rather than in wealthier 
communities. Wisconsin solved its issue with unofficial recruiters by publishing the names of the 
state-authorized agents alongside recruitment posters to avoid any complications with the 
enlistment process. Once Michigan and Wisconsin solved these primary issues, the efficiency of 
their recruiting improved. During 1864 and 1865, Michigan enlisted 40 percent of its total 
recruits while Wisconsin procured 43 percent of its total men.12 Patriotism still stimulated 
recruitment, especially of reenlisting veterans, but bounties appear to have been very influential 
in motivating Michiganders and Wisconsinites to serve. The recruiting apparatuses of these two 
states allowed them to arrive at a service record in 1865 which Kentucky had obtained in early 
1864. 
Kentucky’s recruitment efforts, compared to those of Michigan and Wisconsin, 
emphasize how preserving slavery spurred the state’s unionist loyalty. Despite Lincoln’s 
Republican Administration and fear of abolition, white Kentuckians generally contended the 
Constitution afforded their institutions long-term protection and stability. The troop surge in 
1861, meant to combat a Rebel invasion, simultaneously sought to protect the state’s sovereign 
decision to remain neutral as the best way to protect slavery. This same motivating factor 
encouraged another surge of white volunteers in 1863, as emancipation and black enlistments 
threatened the existence of slavery. During 1863, white Kentuckians intended to maintain the 
integrity of the institution by filling the troop quota themselves and negating the need for black 
recruitment. Furthermore, Kentuckians managed to procure most of these white troops without 
                                                          
12 I calculated this number by adding these states’ 1864 and 1865 recruits and dividing it by the total number of 
troops. Michigan’s 1864 and 1865 recruits (36,998) divided by its total troop contribution (90,747) equals 40 





conscripting, demonstrating volunteerism unmatched by Michigan or Wisconsin. The desire to 
preserve and perpetuate slavery motivated white Kentuckians to exhaust their population by 
volunteering for Union service. However, Kentucky could not sustain these efforts indefinitely. 
By April of 1864, with white enlistments unable to fill the state’s quota, the state allowed federal 
recruiters to mobilize black Kentuckians. 
Black Kentuckians entered federal service in significant numbers. Hoping to free 
themselves and their families, thousands of African Americans left their masters and volunteered 
for Union service. Although it is hard to determine Kentucky’s black population in 1864 and 
1865, owing to the migratory movements of former slaves, quantitative data and newspaper 
accounts imply black recruitment significantly weakened slavery in the state. Respectively 
supplying 67 and 55 percent of Kentucky’s 1864 and 1865 troop totals, black Kentuckians made 
up the majority of the state’s recruits during the twelve months they could enlist. In total, 23,703 
black Kentuckians enlisted, increasing Kentucky’s total Union troop contribution to 102,425 
soldiers.13 To the dismay of Kentucky’s white population, black Kentuckians actively dismantled 
slavery within the state. 
Anne Marshall’s examination of post-war Kentucky emphasized black recruitment as the 
primary reason the state subscribed to pro-Confederate memory during Reconstruction. Marshall 
contended black recruitment represented “the ultimate final blow” to white Kentuckians who had 
fought for the Union to preserve slavery and white superiority.14 Maintaining 71 percent of 
Kentucky’s white adult male population remained inactive throughout the war, Marshall claimed 
these men could have enlisted to prevent black recruitment, but refused owing to tepid unionism 
                                                          
13 I calculated this number by adding Kentucky’s white, federal and state troops (78,722) to the black soldiers 
(23,703) to get 102,425. 




and fear of abolitionism.15 Because the federal army was inducting, and more importantly, 
garrisoning former slaves in Kentucky, the state’s white inhabitants could not escape the 
realization their way of life was coming to an end. Essentially, Marshall reasoned black 
recruitment was the decisive component which shaped Kentucky’s post-war memory and 
identity. 
However, black recruitment did not necessarily represent the end of slavery to many 
white Kentuckians, merely a temporary burden. Marshall’s claim that Kentucky’s inactive white 
population proves black recruitment’s detrimental impact on unionism does not correspond with 
the state’s population and recruitment data.16 Federal recruitment of Kentucky’s African 
Americans did not begin until the state had already exhausted its white population. Recruitment 
data and newspaper opinion testify that white Kentuckians reluctantly accepted black recruitment 
on the premise they could rebuild or re-establish slavery after the war ended. Although black 
recruitment significantly weakened Kentucky slavery as thousands of African Americans entered 
service and freed themselves and their families, the introduction and passage of the Thirteenth 
Amendment during the final eight months of the war, forbade any possible recovery of slavery 
by permanently outlawing the institution nationwide. While this measure validated the efforts of 
black Kentuckians, it contradicted the cause for which many white Kentuckians had served and 
sacrificed. Consequently, by the conclusion of the war, many white Kentuckians disassociated 
from the federal government, lending rise to pro-Confederate memory and identity.17 
                                                          
15 Marshall, Creating a Confederate Kentucky, 20. According to Marshall’s footnote, secondary sources provided 
Kentucky’s population and recruitment numbers. 
16 Marshall’s estimations of Kentucky’s troops numbers and total service record do not match the 1860 Census of 
the state’s Adjutant General Reports. 
17 For more information on Confederate memory in post-war Kentucky, see Marshall, Creating a Confederate 




While most historians of Civil War Kentucky emphasized the state’s pro-slavery 
unionism, they contended the 1863 Emancipation Proclamation, accompanied with the threat of 
black recruitment, diminished the state’s loyalty. However, Kentucky’s yearly recruitment 
suggests the opposite is true. Throughout 1863 and the first three months of 1864, Kentucky 
committed its final reserves of white manpower to the Union to circumvent the need to recruit 
African Americans.18 Ironically, the threat of emancipation and black recruitment preserved 
Kentucky’s slavery and kept the institution relatively intact for over a year as white men 
volunteered to fill the quota. The introduction of the Thirteenth Amendment, coupled with the 
dismantlement of slavery through black recruitment in April 1864, made many white 
Kentuckians feel the Union had betrayed their interests. 
Comparing the recruitment data of these three states emphasizes slavery as the primary 
differentiator behind respective enlistment motivation. Examining these state’s individual 
recruitment returns proves Kentucky furnished similar numbers of white troops despite 
handicaps from Confederate recruiting and internal warfare. The threat of emancipation and 
black recruitment did not weaken the Border State’s loyalty to the Union. Instead, white 





                                                          
18 Comparing Kentucky’s recruitment to Michigan and Wisconsin during the time emphasizes the Border State’s 
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